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Suspension and Termination of
Pension Plans*
Sheldon M. Young
REVENUE RULING 55-186: A BRAKE UPON INTERMITTENT
CONTRIBUTIONS To PROFIT-SHARING PLANS
The Treasury Department, from the very inception of the enactment
of section 165 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, took the position that
only a permanent program
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law that:
a profit-sharing plan... is a plan established and maintained by an em-
ployer to provide for the participation in his profits, by his employees
or their beneficiaries based on a definite predetermined formula for
determining the profits to be shared and a definite predetermined for-
mula for distributing the funds accumulated under the plan after a fixed
number of years, the attainment of a stated age, or upon the prior occur-
rence of some event such as illness, disability, retirement, death or sever-
ance of employment. A formula for determining the profits to be
shared is definite for example if it provides for a contribution equal to(a) a specified percentage of the annual profits, (b) a specified per-
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*This article is based on a Master's Thesis presented at Western Reserve University School
of Law in 1962.
In the fall of 1962, the Internal Revenue Code was amended so as to include a new pro-
vision therein (5 4 01(a) (7)). This article will not consider the impact of that statutory
change on the subject matter discussed herein. It should be noted, however, that essentially,
§ 401 (a) (7) provides that upon termination of a plan, all interests are non-forfeitable to the
extent then funded. However, that statute goes on to state that the provision requiring non-
forfeitability would not apply to benefits or contributions which, under Regulations adopted
to preclude discrimination, may not be used for certain designated employees in the event of
early termination of the plan. Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service published Treasury
Regulations 1401-4(c) (2)-(5) inclusive. These substantially reiterate the rules originally
promulgated in 1945 as Mimeograph 5717 restrictions.
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centage of the salaries of the participants or their contributions if any
to the fund.'
The rule appeared to have a logical basis, and met with the ap-
proval of many pension planners who were otherwise critical of certain
rules developed by the Treasury Department.2 On the other hand,
there were many critics of the rule who maintained that the Treasury
was establishing a substantive rule of law not properly within the scope
of the statute. Shortly after the enactment of section 165 (a), several
so-called "one shot" profit-sharing programs were adopted pursuant to
which substantial portions of profit were contributed to a plan in one
year. None of these programs stipulated a requirement of recurrent
employer contributions. Since they were adopted during World War
II when corporate tax rates were very high, the absence of a require-
ment for recurring contributions gave rise to the suspicion that they
were devices to avoid tax rather than promote employer-employee re-
lations. Nevertheless, deductions to a large number of these programs
went unchallenged. In one case, however, the size of the single con-
tribution, $1,000,000, was apparently large enough to invite a dis-
allowance from the Treasury Department.
In Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust,3 the court
held that the Commissioner could not infer from the language in the
regulation that the adjective "permanent" preceded the word "plan" so
as to infuse the word "plan" with an interpretation that required re-
curring contributions. Turning to another part of the regulations (not
quoted above), the court noted that the word "contributions," a plural,
when used in connection with the verbs "continue" and "discontinue"
was too fortuitous to imply an intent on the part of the framers that
recurrence thereof would be required. Moreover, the court stated that
the trust itself should be examined to determine whether it furthered
the statutory scheme, whether it was discriminatory and whether any
funds could revert to the employer.
Was the court right? Certainly the use of the term "formula" in
the 1939 Regulation implies that a mathematical method would be re-
curringly used to determine yearly contributions, for otherwise, the term
1. Regulations 111, (INT. REV. CODE OF 1939) § 29.165-1(a), as amended, T.D. 5422,
1944 CUM. BULL. 318.
2. CLARK, PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS (LAW AND TAXEs) 59 (1946).
3. Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust, 14 T.C. 598 (1950), rev'd, 190 F.2d
326 (6th Cir. 1951). The writer has discussed this case with Mr. Leonard Williams, head of
the Cleveland Office of the Pension Trust Section who originally ruled that the plan did not
qualify, and with Mr. R.S. Jett, trustee involved in the litigation. Mr. Jett suggested that at
least eight trusts similar to that involved in the Lincoln Electric case passed review without
challenge. Mr. Williams advises that the challenge in Lincoln Electric was raised because of
the large size of the deduction claimed.
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"amount" would have sufficed, thus eliminating much of the text in that
Regulation. If we examine the matter from the standpoint of furthering
the "statutory scheme," it is to be noted that the Senate Committee4
took cognizance of the classical definition of a profit-sharing plan which
was fixed by the International Cooperative Congress at its meeting in
Paris in 1889. A profit-sharing plan was there defined as "an Agree-
ment, freely entered into, by which employees receive a share, fixed in
advance, of the profits." The Senate Committee stated, however, that
it did not wish to be limited by this narrow term but rather by objectives
which would (a) fortify our democratic form of government, (b)
preserve our system of private capitalism, (c) ameliorate labor disputes,
and (d) cement employer-employee relations. In the Lincoln Electric
case, the court felt that a substantial endowment of $1,000,000 furthered
these objectives. But, it remains to be seen whether, under conditions
different from those in the Lincoln Electric case, such as a smaller con-
tribution, slower vesting rate, and a high labor turnover, there is a
furtherance of the "statutory scheme." If we examine the matter from
the standpoint of discrimination, the Ryan School Retirement Trust5
case should be reviewed. It illustrates how a single contribution can
search its way without intent into the accounts of those in whose favor
discrimination may not exist in order to obtain tax qualification. The
result is no different where there is a discriminatory motive in the
timing of contributions. Certainly, the requirement of a recurring con-
tribution by a healthy, profitable company considerably minimizes the
hazards of manipulation which, because of the motive, produces results
that fall within the purview of statutory discrimination. This is in
contrast with the Ryan School case where discrimination was not present
despite similar results.
Predetermined Formula
It was for these reasons that the Commissioner resisted the decision
and unsuccessfully litigated the issue in the courts. Shortly before the en-
actment of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, it had been decided that
in the absence of a predetermined formula in a plan, the employer was
free to contribute what he would to the program subject to his making
proper accruals before the dose of his tax year.' However, where the em-
ployer's plan stipulated a definite predetermined formula, it had been
held by the Tax Court that the taxpayer would be entitled to no greater
4. S. REP. No. 610, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1939).
5. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
6. Commissioner v. Produce Reporter Co., 207 F.2d 586 (7th Cir. 1953).
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deduction than that permitted by the formula stipulated in the plan.'
The court of appeals refused to recognize this self-imposed limita-
tion by the taxpayer where the taxpayer exercised a most informal
method of "amending" the plan - a mere board resolution changing
the formula.' When Congress considered the enactment of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, a specific provision was written into the pro-
posed House Bill eliminating the requirement of a definite predetermined
formula so as to put this issue to rest.' The bill never passed, but the
handwriting was on the wall; the circuit courts in the country had de-
cided that a definite predetermined formula was not necessary, and the
Tax Court acquiesced to the opinion. By 1955, the Commissioner was
ready "to throw in the sponge." The proposed regulations to the 1954
Code eliminated the requirement of a definite predetermined formula,
and the final regulation under the 1954 Code with respect to profit-
sharing plans read as follows:
A profit-sharing plan is a plan established and maintained by an em-
ployer to provide for the participation in his profits by his employees
or the beneficiaries. The plan must provide a definite predetermined
formula for allocating the contributions made to the plan among the
participants and for distributing the funds accumulated under the plan
after a fixed number of years, by the attainment of a stated age or upon
the prior occurrence of some event such as layoff, illness, disability, re-
tirement, death or severance of employment. A formula for allocating
the contribution among the participants is definite if, for example, it
provides for an allocation in proportion to the basic compensation of
each participant. A plan (whether or not it contains a definite prede-
termined formula for determining the profits to be shared with the em-
ployees) does not qualify under Section 401 (a) if contributions for the
plan are made at such times or in such amounts that the plan in opera-
tion discriminates in favor of officers, shareholders, persons whose prin-
cipal duties consist in supervising the work of other employees, or high-
ly compensated employees. 10
About the time that the Service was preparing this regulation re-
pealing its prior requirement of a predetermined formula, and shortly
before the Tax Court published its decision in the Ryan School case,
Revenue Ruling 55-186 was published." In Revenue Ruling 55-186,
the Service held that in order for a plan to qualify, it must contain a pro-
7. Progressive Welder Co., 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 934 (1953); McClintock-Trunkey Co.,
19 T.C. 297 (1952), rev'd, 217 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1954).
8. McClintock-Trunkey Co., supra note 7.
9. H.R. Doc. No. 8300, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. § 501(e) (1954).
10. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (1) (ii) (1956) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 5], as amended,
T.D. 6675, 1963 INT. REv. BULL. No. 41, at 37. Later, the service issued rulings which com-
pletely acquiesced in the position taken by the courts. In Rev. Proc. 56-22, 1956-2 CUM. BULL.
1380, the Service ruled that a previously issued favorable determination letter would apply to a
plan as amended if the sole purpose of an amendment would be to remove a stipulation for a
predetermined formula.
11. Rev. Rul. 55-186, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 39.
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vision that in the event of discontinuance of contributions, the rights of
participants would be fully vested therein as upon termination of the pro-
gram. It will be recalled from the Ryan School case that, where con-
tributions had been discontinued and several participants had terminated
employment following the termination, the forfeitures had searched their
way into the accounts of the remaining participants and had thereby
created a large increment in the accounts of the highest paid participants.
One can only suspect that the Service published Revenue Ruling 55-186
in anticipation of the adverse decision later rendered in the Ryan School
case. The effect of the rule is to prevent forfeitures upon discontinuance
of contributions, for with full vesting on discontinuance of contribution,
such as on termination of a plan, forfeiture will not occur and a situation
such as Ryan School could not occur.
Coming at the time when the Service was abandoning its require-
ment for a definite predetermined formula in a profit-sharing plan, the
ruling was as a cloud obscuring the clarity of the rule. Did the Service
really mean that one need not have a predetermined formula? If so,
what good was it not to have a definite predetermined formula with
the right to suspend contributions for a few years if the result of such
suspension would be to fully vest the employees in order to obtain quali-
fication of the plan, for the agents in the Service interpreted the word
suspension as being synonymous with discontinuance.
To further confuse the issue, Treasury PS 5712 must also be con-
sidered. Treasury PS 57 concerns not a profit-sharing plan but a pension
plan, and in answer to the question as to when contributions to a pen-
sion plan could be suspended without impairing qualification, the Service
held that this could be done so long as: (a) benefits were not affected,
and (b) the contributions to the plan were sufficient to cover the normal
cost plus the interest on the unfunded past service liability. Since a de-
duction taken on the basis of a normal cost plus one-tenth of the past
service liability will build up a cushion in current years against future
contributions under this provision, it is possible to have suspensions of
contributions to a program without in fact impairing the qualified status.
Since Revenue Ruling 55-186 did not distinguish between pension and
profit-sharing plans, the issue arose, following the publication of Revenue
Ruling 55-186, as to the applicability of Treasury PS 57.
A year after the issuance of Revenue Ruling 55-186, the Service
published Revenue Ruling 56-5963 In essence, the Service held that
so long as the requirements of Treasury PS 57 were met, it would not be
necessary in pension plan cases to invoke the full vesting of equities re-
12. P.S. Rulings are Pension Trust Division Information Releases. [P.S. Rulings may be
found in 2 P-H Pension & Profit Sharing Serv. 5 12,502 and are herinafter cited as P.S. No.).
13. Rev. Rul. 56-596, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 288.
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quired by Revenue Ruling 55-186 merely because a contribution was
skipped in one year.
Predetermination of Qualification
In Revenue Ruling 56-596, the Service also stated that the facts
would be examined to determine whether a suspension of contributions
in the case of a profit-sharing plan would be a discontinuance of con-
tributions in a particular case. The ruling stated that the employer and
the trustee were to notify the Commissioner at any time that there would
be a suspension or discontinuance in order that a redetermination regarding
qualification could be made. On occasion, the Service has gone further.
The various pension trust sections in the various offices of the Director
of Internal Revenue exercise a degree of latitude in applying the
rules which they may impose prior to issuing a determination letter
ruling favorably upon the qualification of a plan. In certain districts
there has been a refusal to approve a plan in advance, unless it contains
a clause to the effect that a certain minimum contribution to the plan be
made each year. This seems to be in conflict with the rule 4 developed
by the Treasury Department that inclusion in advance of such provisions
will not eliminate the necessity of including provisions in a plan to fulfill
compliance with Revenue Ruling 55-186.
The effect of Revenue Ruling 55-186, as modified by Revenue Rul-
ing 56-596, is, therefore, to neutralize the decision of the court in the
Ryan School case. While a formal requirement for recurring contribu-
tions is not a prerequisite for qualification, a stipulation in the plan that
discontinuance will be treated as a termination would prevent a result
similar to that in Ryan School even though the absence of a bad motive
would cause a court to refuse to construe such a result as discrimination
within the scope of the statute. Securing a favorable determination letter
assures the employer of his deduction, allows him to invest in "pooled-
funds" for qualified trusts, and has certain other practical advantages.
Hence, it is not likely that the results in the Ryan School 5 case will arise
again, for the Service will apparently refuse to issue a favorable determi-
nation letter unless the profit-sharing plan contains a clause complying
with Revenue Ruling 55-186. This ruling seems to support the statutory
scheme, for however proper the motive of the principals in the Ryan
School case, the results must be admitted to be bad. The ruling states in
effect that while the holding in the Lincoln Electric case must be con-
ceded, evils' " can arise because of the irregular timing of contributions.
14. Rev. Rul. 60-2, 1960-1 CuLM. BuLL. 164.
15. Ryan School Retirement Trust, 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
16. Is it possible that the Service was not so much concerned with the "evils" as with a de-
sire to enrich the tax coffers during a period of high taxation by blocking plans with no
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The incidence of these evils will be minimized by having full vesting take
place if contributions are discontinued. Moreover, should contributions
be suspended, the Service must be advised in order that it may determine
whether the motive in timing contributions was to favor the "prohibited
group."
TREASURY PS 57: A BRAKE UPON INTERMITTENT
CONTRIBUTIONS
In part 2(h) of Revenue Ruling 57-163,17 the Service restated a
position which it has taken from the publication of the earliest regula-
tions established in connection with plans designed to qualify for tax
privileges. A "plan," says the Service, is a permanent and continuing
program. Yet as was seen in the Lincoln Electric" case, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals and the dissenting judges in the Tax Court did not
agree with the Commissioner that a program must be permanent for
purposes of the statute. As noted previously in this article, 9 PS 57 holds
that contributions to a plan may be suspended without affecting prior
rulings respecting qualification, provided however that payment of bene-
fits is not affected thereby, and that the unfunded past service cost at any
time, including any unfunded prior normal cost and unfunded interest on
any unfunded cost, does not exceed the past service cost as of the date of
establishment of the plan. Revenue Ruling 56-596 has extended this
requirement by holding that the unfunded cost for purposes of the rule in-
cludes unfunded costs added by the amendment. Presumably, the right
to make such rulings is grounded on the thesis that the "statutory word
'plan' implies 'permanent plan,' and 'permanent plan,' as to funded pen-
sion benefits, implies a minimum standard of actuarial adequacy or sound-
ness."2 Although a profit-sharing plan was the topic of consideration in
the Lincoln Electric case, the reasoning of the court may cast some doubt
upon this thesis.2
It is a basic principle of law that income tax statutes will be strictly
construed whereas social legislation will be liberally construed. In sec-
tion 401(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code and its predecessor,
section 165 (a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, as amended, there
can be found a socially inspired tax statute; hence, a miscegenous marriage
requirements for recurring contributions? In the Lincoln Electric case, the government lost
$850,000 from what it claimed in taxes. How much it garnered by a rule which discouraged
similar plans cannot be estimated.
17. Rev. Rul. 57-163, pt. 2(h), 1957-1 Cum. BTLL. 128, 133.
18. Lincoln Elec. Co. Employees' Profit-Sharing Trust, 14 T.C. 598 (1950), rev'd, 190.F.2d
326 (6th Cir. 1951).
19. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
20. PARnmsoN, LEGAL PROTECTiON OF PRIVATE PENSION EXPECTAiONS 92 (1960).
21. Ibid.
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of principles of construction results. However, the position taken
thus far by the Tax Court and by the courts of appeal indicates that
these statutes are to be treated in their social context rather than in their
tax context. In other words, they are to be construed liberally rather
than strictly. That being the case, the question arises as to whether
Treasury PS 57 promotes the purpose of Congress when it requires that
contributions to a pension plan be made so as to prevent its original
unfunded liabilities from increasing.
In this context, the Lincoln Electric case is of doubtful assistance, for
it dealt with a profit-sharing plan. The contribution of $1,000,000
in that case was cited by the court as possibly promoting the
statutory scheme in view of the fact that a one sum payment of that
amount could, through capital increases and interest income over the
future years of the trust, produce a greater effect for the benefit of the
individuals involved than the mere contribution of several sums over a
period of years, such as $100,000 a year for 10 years. Dealing with a
pension plan, however, is an entirely different matter; from its very nature
it demands continuation for years and even into perpetuity. In
order to meet the requirement of payment of benefits from such a plan,
repeated actuarial valuations are required, at least in self-insured plans,
in order to determine what sums of money must be contributed in order
to maintain actuarial solvency. A ruling which requires that an em-
ployer evaluate liabilities regularly and contribute systematically in order
to maintain a pension program on an even keel should be treated differ-
ently than a comparable ruling which has been judicially struck down
where the comparable ruling applies to a profit-sharing plan. The latter
is a different type of program, albeit authorized by conjunctive text in
the statute authorizing the deduction to the pension plan.
One might suspect however, that such a requirement could have
a discouraging effect on the adoption of such programs. While nothing
in the qualification provisions of the statute requires that an employer
retain an actuary, the deduction provisions of section 404 of the Internal
Revenue Code make it clear that retaining an actuary is necessary in
order to determine the maximum deductions. For example, if an em-
ployer claims his deduction under section 404(a) (1) (A) of the Code,
section 1.404 (a) -4 of the Regulations requires the filing of an actuarial
certificate of the amount reasonably necessary to pay the unfunded past
service liability and current service credits. The statute provides that the
Commissioner may reduce the five per cent of payroll deduction upon
periodical examination at not less than five year intervals, and the Re-
gulations indicate that actuarial certificates shall be filed upon request.
Further, if the employer takes a deduction under section 404(a) (1) (C),
it becomes necessary for the employer to determine the amount of the
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past service liability in order that a deduction equal to no more than
ten per cent of the unfunded initial past service liability be taken in
any year. Sections 1.404(a)-4 and 1.404(a)-6 of the Regulations,
which were issued in connection with these provisions, adequately indi-
cate that a statement of the methods, factors, and assumptions employed
by the actuary in determining the contributions to the plan must be filed.
This vocabulary is probably confusing to the uninitiated who may
rightly ask, "What is unfunded cost?" It is defined in section 1.404-4(b)
of the Regulations as the sum of (1) the unfunded past service cost as
of the beginning of the year, and (2) the normal cost for that year.
Normal cost is defined in a later part of section 1.404-6(a) of the
Regulations as follows:
[Normal cost is the] amount actuarially determined which would be
required as a contribution by the employer in such year to maintain the
plan if the plan had been in effect from the beginning of service of
each then included employee and if such costs for prior years had been
paid and all assumptions as to interest, mortality, time of payment, etc.,
had been fulfilled. Past service or supplementary cost at any time is the
amount actuarially determined which would be required to meet all the
future benefits provided under the plan which would not be met by fu-
ture normal costs and employee contributions with respect to the em-
ployees covered under the plan at such time.22
Accrued Liability Defined
In other publications (notably the Bureau Bulletin on 23 (p) (1) (A)
and (B)) the Service has considered various actuarial techniques for com-
puting pension costs. These rulings are quite intricate, and because of their
technicality they do not lend themselves to easy understanding. There-
fore, it is better to turn to other sources for more easily understood defini-
tions. A more meaningful definition of "accrued liability" is as follows:
Accrued liability for past service is the actuarially calculated lump sum
payment that would have to be made by companies at the date of ori-
gin of the plan in order to discharge fully the assumed obligation for
service already completed by employees who may be expected to remain
with the company until retirement age. In effect it is the amount re-
quired to compensate for the fact that companies did not install a pen-
sion system at an earlier date and make current provisions for accumu-
lating pension credits of their work force.
Accrued liability may also be defined as "the single-sum, total cost of a
pension plan that would pay benefits based only on service up to the
present time." (Technically, the aggregate past service cost at any time
represents the value at that time of that portion of the total estimated
cost of the plan which is attributable to prior years)....23
22. Reg. § 1A04(a)-6(a) (2) (1965), as amended, T.D. 6534, 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 145.
23. DEARING, INDUSTRIAL PENSIONS 137 n.9 (1954).
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Good descriptions of how accrued liability is calculated are equally
hard to find. The following is perhaps as good as any.
First . .. [actuaries] compute, for the pension group, how much the
eventual pensions will probably come to - taking into account such fac-
tors as labor turnover, mortality rate, and interest on pension monies.
Then they figure "current service cost" [normal cost]. That's the
amount of payment required annually - plus earned interest - to pay
pensions to survivors based on their service from the time the funding
starts.
Burden of Past - But at that point the actuaries are just beginning to
sharpen their pencils. (For the worker's pension has to include his ser-
vice before the pension plan started.) So the actuaries figure "past
service cost" - the amount that would have accumulated up to that
time if the plan had been operating. And in figuring this, the actuaries
don't stop at the annual sums that would have been paid in; they add in
the interest that would have been piling up year by year.24
It is well to note at this point that neither the Internal Revenue
Code nor the Regulations require an employer to pay off the past service
liability. If there were such a requirement, the effect would be to
impose upon the taxpayer a more stringent set of requirements than those
imposed by Treasury PS 57. To illustrate this point it is helpful to
examine the comparative pension law and procedures in vogue at one
time in Canada. Under section 76(1) of the Canadian Income Tax Act, 5
if contributions are made to a registered superannuation fund
in respect of past services pursuant to a recommendation by a qualified
actuary in whose opinion the resources of the fund or plan required to
be augmented by the amount of one or more special payments to ensure
that all obligations of the fund or plan to employees may be discharged
in full - and the payment has been approved by the Minister on the
advice of the Superintendent of Insurance there may be deducted in
computing the income for the taxation year the lesser of (a) 1/10 of
the whole amount so recommended to be paid. .... 26
With these statutory guideposts, probably inserted in order to charge the
agency best equipped to determine the correctness of the size of a deduc-
tion claimed rather than the propriety of claiming it, the Superintendent
of Insurance took the position that deductions should not be granted
to actuarially unsound plans. Furthermore, he consistently refused to
grant advice that a payment for past services was deductible unless the
Ministry of Insurance was satisfied that there was a final dater for fully
24. The Startling Impact of Private Pension Plans, Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, p. 94.
25. CAN. REV. STAT. c. 148, § 76(1) (1952).
26. Ibid.
27. Cf. DEPARTmENT OF NATIONAL REVENUE, INFORMATION BULL. No. 14, pts. 9(e)-
(1) (b), (2) where the text of certificates required of an actuary with respect to past service
contributions under both an insured and trusteed pension plan is stipulated. That of a funded
pension trust reads as follows:
I hereby certify that in my opinion the assets of the pension fund of (name of er-
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paying off the past service obligation. Also, in cases involving only a few
lives, the Ministry of Insurance had to be satisfied that there was an ex-
press provision in the program that on retirement the full reserve would
be in the fund for payment of the annuity to a pensioner. This position is
far less flexible than that taken by actuaries in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue who first drew the text of Treasury PS 57. However, it must be
noted that our statute did not give them the breadth of control contained
in the Canadian statute. In our country, the tax authorities have had to
breathe actuarial soundness into the meaning of the word "plan" in order
to require valuations, whereas in Canada the express provisions of law
dearly empowered actuaries to pass upon and make rules for plans before
deductions would be allowed.
In either nation, the economic problems faced by an employer re-
quire that he have some flexibility in meeting his pension funding com-
mitment. With the maximum deductible contribution fixed by statute,
and the minimum fixed by ruling, a tax deductible range of contribution
has developed, all based upon computations involving the past service
liability. Commenting on this range, one writer made the following sum-
mary of its practical effect in the United States.
When a company makes a decision to go into the process of full fund-
ing, it sets up something in the nature of a mortgage - and a sizable
one - on its future operations. It's a type of financial operation that
can add little or nothing to productivity, and the obligation can be liqui-
dated only out of accumulated reserves or future profits.
Yet this new type of mortgage gives management a spanking new fi-
nancial tool, one it's just learning how to handle. For the lack of any
IRS time limit gives management some leeway. In effect, past service
liability can work like a giant open-end mortgage which can be paid off
during the good years and even provide a nest egg for the lean ones.
Suppose a company had a $500 million past service obligation which it
was funding on a 10-year basis. That would mean setting aside $50
million a year (leaving interest out of the calculation). In high-profit
years, this makes good sense; after tax profits would be down $25 mil-
lion, but the tax collector would get $25 million less.
Then after five years, suppose the company hits rough financial weather.
It could shift to a 30 year funding basis for past service, while main-
taining present service payments. That preserves the financial integrity
of the pension plan, yet slices the annual contribution in half. Earnings
look better, and the company conserves cash.
Or it could go further, as U.S. Steel did. Funding on a 10% basis,
(which actually boils down to an 11 year period) the corporation
ployer) as at (date) required to be augmented by an amount of $ ------- to
ensure that all obligations of the fund in respect of past service of employees may
be discharged in fall and I recommend that this amount be paid into the fund
(indicate the method and period of payment).
The same certificate is contained in earlier Regulations (pts. 8(e)-(1) (b) and (c)-(1) (c)
known as the "blue book"). See MERCER, CANADIAN HANDBooK OF PENSION AND WEL-
FARE PLANs 121-34 (1956).
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reduced its past service liability by $297 million from 1950 through
1957. This past year, with earnings down, it decided to forego past
service funding, used the money instead for new plant and equipment.
Of course, a company can never withdraw past contribution, already
made to the pension fund. But in a dire cash pinch, it can make a
bookkeeping shift - transferring, say $25 million from the accumu-
lated past service fund to the present service account as the current
year's present service contribution.
This could permit a company to skip its present service payment and
might help put black ink on its income statement in a bad year.2"
Labor Negotiated Plans
Treasury PS 57 has, therefore, bred into the environment of pension
planning the concept that there is a safe area of maximum and minimum
financing. It should be strongly emphasized that this is a "tax-
safe" area, and that funding at the minimum required by PS 57 does not
guarantee solvency or a continuation of pension payments should a plan
terminate. This was vividly pointed out in the course of a debate between
representatives of the steel industry and Mr. Murray Latimer, actuary for
the United Steelworkers of America, during the inception of labor nego-
tiated pension plans. In 1949, negotiations between the parties reached
a stalemate on the question of whether the pension plan to be adopted
should be contributory, as demanded by the industry, or non-contributory,
as demanded by the union.29 This introduced the question of cost with
United States Steel maintaining that on the basis of its statistics, the plan
demanded by the union would initially impose upon it a debt of one bil-
lion dollars due to past service liability." Mr. Latimer, on the other hand,
contended that this liability need only be "frozen," i.e., it would create a
frozen initial past service liability."' If it were placed in a fund, said
Mr. Latimer, it would have an economic function, namely the earning
of interest.32 Therefore, the union proposed that interest alone on the
debt plus the normal cost be paid - essentially that Treasury PS 57 be
met. Mr. Latimer stated that this would cover all payments due pen-
sioners. The presumption in the union's agreement was that the plan
28. The Startling Impact of Private Pension Plans, Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959, p. 95. In
Canada, a measure of this flexibility has been obtained by having the actuary's certificate
stipulate, inter alia: "I recommend that this amount be paid into the fund over a period
of not less than twenty (20) years." See note 27 supra. This has been found acceptable.
29. See Davenport, Pensions, Not If but How, Fortune Magazine, Nov. 1949, p. 82.
30. Id. at 218. Were the actuaries correct? Note the figure of the reduced past service
liabilities in The Startling Impact of Private Pension Plans, Business Week, Jan. 31, 1959,
p. 97.
31. Davenport, op. cit. supra note 29, at 218.
32. Mr. Latimer made a similar statement which is reported in Weiss, Funding Practices Un-
der Labor Negotiated Pension Plans, in 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF ACTUARIES
IN PUBLIC PRACTICE 71 (1952).
[Vol 15:667
Young, Pension Plans
would be a continuing affair running into perpetuity. But, the weakness
in this position as it applies to smaller companies was aptly summarized
by one writer as follows:
The Latimer Plan for freezing past service liability introduces obvious
risks, especially for smaller companies. For if a company goes bank-
rupt, or the plan is simply terminated there will be no funds accumu-
lated to continue the pension benefits of those already retired, let alone
those hoping to retire. Mr. Latimer's argument for freezing instead of
amortizing appeared to be opportunistic - an effort to show how low
pension costs could be without citing the risks. Conservative actuaries
insist that a plan should be fully funded within twenty-five or thirty
years or sooner. Since the government will allow tax exemption on
only 10 per cent of the past-service liability each year, most companies
amortize over a period of eleven or more years33
The importance of this point cannot be minimized in this article for
company after company has bargained to install the "steel plan." Such
plans are usually patterned after the one negotiated by United States Steel
or Bethlehem Steel, and the text often prepared in Pittsburgh by the
union's attorneys follows the text of one of those two plans. However,
it must not be thought that so fine an actuary as Mr. Latimer was igno-
rant of the weaknesses in "intexest only" payments. While the plans
negotiated with United States Steel and some others have stipulated that
the company is free to determine the amount of contributions to be made,
contracts presented by the United Steelworkers Union to smaller com-
panies have contained clauses demanding that the plans be financed on a
basis known as "terminal funding." One authority has described the
method of computation under such a "terminal funding" basis as follows:
Under terminal funding the lump sum value of the pension is paid into
the plan upon each member's retirement. In some instances an attempt
at leveling such payments is made by projecting the amount required
under this method over some fixed future period, such as five years,
and then computing the level payment which if paid over the five years
will equal the total required. Under either straight terminal funding
or the modification described, full reserves required to meet benefits of
the members retiring are paid over to the plan as and when they retire,
but nothing is accumulated as respects benefits accruing to members
presently on the active payroll.34
It is clear that this method, if employed, can result in staccato pay-
ments, with a regularity dictated only by the regularity of retirements and
payments to retirants. Unlike the Canadian Income Tax Act 5 which spe-
33. Davenport, op. cit. supra note 29, at 218. See also BRONSON, CONCEPTS op AcruARIAL
SOUNDNESS IN PENSION PLANS 98-99 (1957).
34. BucK, Actuarial Solvency of a Pension Plan, in PENSIONS: PROBLEMS AND TRENDs 128
(1955).
35. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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cifically allows a deduction for a contribution made to a plan that requires
terminal funding,36 our Internal Revenue Code says nothing about deduc-
tions to plans handled on a terminal funding basis. In response to ques-
tions concerning terminal funding, the Service issued Treasury PS 67
which sets forth certain criteria under which contributions made to plans
requiring this type of financing will be construed as contributions made
to a deductible program:
(1) Nothing in any document indicates an intent to discontinue the
program.
(2) There is in some publication made known to the employees
generally the intention of the employer to establish and con-
tinue the program.
(3) There is an explicit provision for liquidating the plan.
In various cases discussed in the course of the ruling, the Service
makes it dear that if the plan is designed to cover only those who are to
retire, deductions will not be allowed except to the extent that they are
applied for the benefit of those who in fact do retire during the period
fixed for the duration of the contract for the plan, and then only to the
extent permitted by the applicable provisions of the statute.
If the employer is required by his union contract to contribute to a
plan, there is no question about the existence of a fixed liability under
the law. Hence, there is a satisfaction of the general requirements of the
tax statutes. Treasury PS 67 is probably right in gauging the deductions
taken according to those who in fact can retire during the term of the con-
tract. But if Treasury PS 67 and Treasury PS 57 are read together, one
may note the possibility of a peculiar situation. By the terms of the union
contract, an employer may be required to establish a plan which meets
Treasury Department "approval," an "approval" which he cannot retain
unless he contributes regularly and systematically to meet the require-
ments of PS 57. At the same time, however, the requirements of the
union contract may be such that there is no need for him to contribute
since no one, in fact, retires. If he does not contribute, it would appear
that he cannot satisfy Treasury PS 57, and if he does contribute, he may
receive no deduction. The answer to this seemingly irreconcilable situa-
tion will not be found in rulings. However, in an article by Mr. Isidore
Goodman, Technical Advisor in Charge, Pension Trust Branch, Internal
Revenue Service, the position of the Service with respect to union negoti-
ated plans providing for terminal funding is summarized as follows: Since
such plans cover the rank-and-file, there is no problem of discrimination.
While failure to make contributions to such plans will be looked upon with
36. CAN. Riy. STAT. c. 148, § 11(1) (h) (1952).
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suspicion, there is a "valid business reason" therefor." As will be dis-
cussed more thoroughly later in this article, a "valid business reason" is re-
quired to be presented upon termination or curtailment of a program in
order to procure from the Service a ruling to the effect that prior rulings
on qualification of a program have not or will not be impaired. Here,
however, a determination as to the consequences of the suspension are not
required for, as Mr. Goodman stated, the "valid business reason" was
originally established by a contract which envisioned contributions only
when and if there are retirements.
Terminal Funding
It should be made dear that employment of "terminal funding" by a
taxpayer has certain disadvantages. From the business point of view,
"the danger is that of setting the plan forth to provide benefits the cost
of which will emerge as an intolerable burden upon the finances of the
employer within twenty or thirty years from the inception of the plan.""
In other words, it is current joy and delayed agony for a going enter-
prise.3" From a tax point of view, "terminal funding" eliminates the ad-
vantage of taking deductions during the current era of prosperity at what
many consider to be abnormally high tax rates, and postponing payments
to a time when both rates and profits may be low. Moreover, the size
of the contribution at the later time may be actually so large as not to fall
within the maximum permitted by law. While the article by Mr. Good-
man is entitled to great respect, it is fairly obscure, and many agents in the
Service, unaware of it, have in certain cases threatened to disqualify ter-
minally funded plans because of failure to meet PS 57. Because of
such inherent defects, many an employer has sought to solve his problem
by having a "double document" arrangement.
A pension plan for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code is a pro-
gram established by the employer. If the employer chooses to establish a
plan to implement a union contract, that is his privilege. Therefore, an
employer with a "steel plan" frequently establishes a plan whose provisions
virtually repeat, with some major exceptions, item by item the provisions
of the union contract. Among these are the provisions in the contract
relating to funding. Often the employer will insert a provision in his
tax qualifying plan that the company is free to contribute to the plan from
time to time in such amounts as its board of directors shall determine,
but no less than it is required to contribute by its collective bargaining
37. Goodman, Termination of Pension Profit-Sharing and Stock Bonus Plans, 32 TAXES 49
(1954).
38. BucK, op. cit. supra note 34, at 130.
39. Its advantage, business-wise, lies in the fact that it enables an employer about to close
down an enterprise to contribute less than he otherwise would.
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agreement. The net effect of such a provision is to establish a minimum
contribution to the plan while at the same time leaving the employer free
to contribute additional sums. In this way, both Treasury PS 57 and the
minimum requirements of the union contract are satisfied. However, if
reference to a minimum contribution in a tax qualifying plan is absent,
the question arises as to whether an employer who fails to meet PS 57
should be exposed to disqualification. The answer to this question is that
it is not the employer who suffers disqualification, but rather his plan and
trust. If the plan is disqualified, the beneficiaries of the trust as well as
the employer suffer, for lack of qualification means tax to the beneficiary
to the extent of his vested interest and tax upon the income of the fund
which can minimize the benefits. Therefore, the presence or absence in
the text of the tax qualifying plan of the minimum contribution required
by union contract should not result in disqualification, for permanence
may be proved and sanctions imposed which do not further the social
purposes of the law.
Auto Workers Plan
Treasury PS 67 is not, however, the only ruling published by the
Service in connection with funding practices under union negotiated plans.
A second ruling that is frequently applied is Treasury PS 64 which was
designed to meet the requirements of plans negotiated by auto workers
and their employers. These plans frequently negotiated by the UAW
have stipulated that the employer would contribute to the plan at the rate
of so many "cents-per-hour" for each hour actually worked by the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit, or every hour for which employees in the
bargaining unit were compensated. It became obvious, however, that
contributions at such a stipulated rate might fail to meet the requirements
of PS 57. In essence, PS 64 stipulates that the deduction under such cir-
cumstances will be allowed provided the employer certifies that he accepts
as reasonable the methods and assumptions employed in computations
made by an actuary to the effect that the expected contributions during
the term of the union contract will not be less than the full current cost
of the prospective benefits, nor less than the normal cost plus interest
accruing on the unfunded past service cost. In essence, the document
required in order to secure a grant of qualification must include the
actuary's certification that the rate of contributions will be more than
sufficient to meet at least the requirements of Treasury PS 57."
40. The author has been advised by persons formerly with the Pension Trust Branch, In-
ternal Revenue Service, that PS 64 was adopted to avoid a "hot potato." Loosely, the phrase
"approved by the Internal Revenue Service" has been thought to indicate that the Service,
despite its disclaimer in determination letters, passes upon and approves the actuarial sound-
ness of pension plans. Actually, the Service does no more than rule that plans do not dis-
criminate. To avoid unfavorable publicity, however, the Service sought to force negotiating
parties to secure valuations under the guise of "proof of permanence."
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It must be emphasized again that a certification made pursuant to
Treasury PS 64 will not guarantee actuarial solvency. Generally, the ac-
tuary renders his certificate on the basis of an assumption that so many
employees work so many hours and that so many will retire during the
term of the union contract. Suppose, however, that the number of hours
worked and the consequent number of hours with respect to which con-
tributions are made, drops substantially. This can happen in the case of
a substantial lay-off or curtailment in work force. Also, the number of
employees who retire may be greater than expected, as can happen if the
plant closes down and the plan terminates simultaneously with all eligible
to retire then entering upon the pension rolls. In the latter instance, the
"depth of the funding" will not have been sufficient to carry the benefits
on the occurrence of the contingency stated. As a counterbalance, the
market value of a trust portfolio at the time of termination may have so
increased as to outweigh the factors, leaving the benefits for provisions
unfunded. Although the expectations of the actuary may have been rea-
sonable, he still does not have a crystal ball to forecast the economic suc-
cess or failure of a marginal producer. Hence, it may be concluded as
noted previously that PS 64, like PS 57, does no more than encourage ac-
tuarial consultation. It places a sensible brake upon exuberant expendi-
ture for unrealistic pensions. It does not, and is not intended to guaran-
tee the payment of benefits where the vicissitudes of a free economy
produce consequences which no one should expect the actuary to antici-
pate.
Mine Workers Plan
At this point, it might be helpful to examine whether Congress has
ever expressed approval of these rules which place a brake upon the mak-
ing of intermittent contributions to a pension plan. The "cents-per-hour"
type of plan was preceded by the "cents-per-ton" type of plan, negotiated
during the time following government seizure of the coal industry. In
1946, an agreement for such a plan had been reached between Julius
King, Secretary of the Interior, and John L. Lewis, President of the United
Mine Workers.41 Doubt existed, however, as to whether that plan ever
qualified under amended section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939.42 Therefore, when Congress amended the Code in 1954, a spe-
cific provision was included in the statute to permit deductions to be
taken for contributions in order to establish that payments to the Mine
Workers Funds were deductible. The provisions of section 4 04 (c) of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code specifically provide that if contributions
are paid by an employer to a pension plan as a result of an agreement
41. For a general discussion of the UAW type plan see Weiss, op. cit. supra note 32, at 73-75.
42. Id. at 98.
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reached between the employee representatives and the government of the
United States, under certain conditions the amounts thereof will not be
deductible under section 404, but will be deductible under section 162.
Hence, it might be suggested that since the plan probably did not meet
the tests of Treasury PS 64, Congress tacitly acquiesced to PS 64 by pass-
ing special legislation to avoid the application of the rule to cases where
it would be unfair to do so. However, reference to that part of the
Senate Committee report on the subject suggests that such was not the
case.43 The Committee made the following statement as to the reason
for inclusion.
Under present law, certain plans established as a result of negotiation
with unions do not constitute qualified plans because they do not segre-
gate pension funds from funds used for other purposes and do not
satisfy other rules required for qualification. This may have the result
of denying employers deductions for contributions to such plans because
present law, which is retained by your Committee, does not allow de-
ductions for contributions for non-qualified plans where employee rights
are forfeitable.
Your Committee feels that this denial of deductions for employer con-
tributions is inequitable where a negotiated plan was established during
a period of Government Operation. Your Committee's bill therefore
provides that employers shall be entitled to deduct as business expenses
contributions made to plans established before January 1, 1954, which
are the result of an agreement between employee representatives and
the United States Government during a period of government seizure
and operation of most of the productive facilities of the industry. This
provision does not appear in the House Bill."4
This report does not indicate confirmation or approbation of the rules
which deny deduction; rather, it indicates that the denial of the deduction
under the circumstances is inequitable. Also, the Senate Technical Report
indicates that the primary reason for the adoption of section 404(c) was
to assure employers of a deduction for a contribution made where the
adoption of a pension program had been compelled as a result of govern-
mental action during a period of seizure.45 No reference is made to the
other rules. The Senate Technical Report indicates that the Senate was
concerned with the fact that certain welfare benefits such as medical and
hospital care as well as pensions were paid from a trust similar to the type
used by the United Mine Workers, a fact which, even had it met PS 64,
would not have permitted qualification under section 401.
Summarizing this point, it can be concluded that so long as the test
of PS 57 is met, the government permits great latitude in the procedure
which a taxpayer may adopt in paying pension plan liabilities. However,
PS 57 does not require and is not intended to require that pension plans





be funded on a basis such that the reserves thereof will support the pen-
sions granted during the lifetime of the plan. If a plan is funded at the
minimum rate required by PS 57, i.e., if contributions are made so as to
meet normal cost plus interest on the past service liability, it does not fol-
low that the fund resulting will contain such reserves. If the purpose of
our law were to effect such security, a minimum would be required akin
to that once demanded by the Canadian Superintendent of Insurance for
registration of a superannuation plan under the Canadian Income Tax Act.
The effect of a violation of PS 57 is to run the risks, among others, of loss
of qualification, right to deduction, resultant taxation of fund income,
and taxation of employees to the extent of their vested right in company
contributions. As modified by Revenue Ruling 56-596, it is also possible
to find that benefits may have become fully vested, which may be re-
garded as a sanction.46 In short, it does not assure "complete depth of
funding"; rather, it does, by requiring a minimum, encourage a sound
actuarial approach to the financing of a pension plan going beyond
the Treasury Department Regulations which require proof of intermittent
valuations solely to determine if contributions fall below a statutory max-
imum.
Statutory Scheme Test
The validity of Treasury PS 57 in subsequent litigation should be deter-
mined not by reference to those words in the Lincoln Electric case wherein
the court alluded to the fact that permanence is not a requirement of a
plan, but rather to the reason that it was held that permanence is not such a
requirement. In this respect, the court stated that the statutory objec-
tives could be fulfilled by a single payment to a profit-sharing plan. Ob-
viously, it may be better to qualify by intermittent contributions, or still
better by regular and systematic contributions to a profit-sharing plan.
A profit-sharing plan does not, by its nature, presume repeated contribu-
tions; rather, by its very nature it contemplates contribution from profit
only as the business demands. On the other hand, a pension plan, by its
nature, holds forth the expectation that at a future time benefits of a fixed
number of dollars will be paid. A ruling which promotes the fulfillment
of this expectation meets the "statutory scheme," for that scheme must be
presumed to contemplate payment of the benefits. Further, because of
the text of the deduction provisions, the "statutory scheme" can be pre-
sumed to expect that funding will be determined on an actuarial basis.
Even if PS 57 should prove to be valid in a court case, it does not
follow that PS 64 would also be held valid, or that PS 57 is to be invoked
whenever a union negotiated plan fails to meet its tests. In the case of
46. Patterson, op. cit. supra note 20, at 93.
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such a negotiated plan, it must be recognized that the employees have
elected, in lieu of a wage increase, a deferred payment. If they want to
waive actuarial solvency, or approach it from a position different from the
one employed as a standard, that is the concern of the employees and their
representatives. Perhaps now that the Welfare and Pension Plans Dis-
closure Act of 1958" is in force, with the avowed purpose of encouraging
self-help, there will be reason for the Treasury Department to retreat from
its paternalistic role and allow the unions to employ the information re-
quired to be filed under the law to promote sound funding. That, it is
submitted, is the function of collective bargaining where a plan is the sub-
ject of contract and not of a tax agency. This reasoning does not, of
course, apply to non-contractual programs where Congress has charged
the tax agency with specific social enforcement powers.
A FURTHER BRAKE ON SUSPENDING CONTRIBUTION TO A
PENSION PLAN - MIMEOGRAPH 5717
In a previous article,4" the provisions of Mimeograph 5717 were con-
sidered in connection with termination of a plan. Paragraph five of
Mimeograph 5717 provides that payment of retirement benefits to em-
ployees may be continued under certain conditions, one of which is that
"the full current costs of the plan have been met" even though the effect
of such payments is to exceed the limits set forth in paragraph three' of
Mimeograph 5717. In this respect the definition of the term "full cur-
rent costs" in paragraph 9(d) of Mimeograph 5717 provides that the
term means the normal cost of a plan plus interest for such period on the
unfunded past service liability. The Mimeograph continues parentheti-
cally, as follows:
The full current costs will always be met in the case of an individual
level premium insurance or annuity contract if the annual premiums are
always paid; in the case of group annuity contracts if the current service
costs are paid and payments for past service costs are sufficient to keep
the unfunded past service cost from increasing; and in the case of
self-insured plans if payments are made to the funds so that the initial
unfunded liability does not increase. 50
It is thus established that there is an interrelationship between the defini-
tions of "full current costs" for purposes of Mimeograph 5717 and Treas-
ury PS 57. At the time Mimeograph 5717 was published, the employ-
ment of plans which used ordinary life insurance contracts coupled with
side investment funds, from which money was taken at retirement age to
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1958).
48. Young, Treasury Mimeograph 5717 - Government Rules Restricting Disbursements
on Termination of a Pension Plan, 15 W. RES. L. REV. 534 (1964).
49. Paragraph 3 of Mimeograph 5717 [hereinafter cited as Mim.] sets forth the formula of
the unrestricted maximum.
50. Mim. 5717, para. 9(d), 1944 CuM. BULL. 323.
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be combined with the cash values at retirement age of the insurance contract
to purchase a contract, were not much in vogue. At the present time,
however, such plans are by far the most common being initiated in con-
nection with the use of life insurance. In Revenue Ruling 55-480, the
Service responded to the question as to when contributions to such a plan
could be suspended by citing PS 57. It may be presumed, therefore, that
the tests established by Mimeograph 5717 in connection with PS 57
will be used to determine the applicability of Mimeograph 5717 to such
plans.
Suppose that a pension plan fails to meet the requirements of Treas-
ury PS 57 because an employer fails to meet the full current cost of
his pension plan. If the plan is a self-funded program, i.e., none of
the monies have been remitted to an insurer, it is fairly simple to
reduce the payments being made to a retired employee to an amount
which is in accord with the amount of his pension multiplied by the ratio
of the then unrestricted maximum over the reserve for that amount of
pension. Correspondingly, it may not be so simple to make arrange-
ments with the insurance company under an individual policy type plan,
or under a plan where the contracts have been converted to annuities to
cause the annuities being paid to the participant to be reduced. Many
schemes have been invoked to meet this particular situation. One of the
most common is to accumulate the amounts in excess of the sum which
may be paid into the fund, and pay the reduced permitted pension to the
participant subject to restriction. At a later time when the employer has
placed the plan back in good graces by meeting full current costs, the
sums withheld may be distributed to the participant or to his estate. It is
not so easy, however, to resume the payment of the full current cost under
the individual policy plan and obtain for the employer a deduction for
the amount which he failed to put into the plan in prior years. It has been
thought that "skipping a premium" on the several contracts of the em-
ployer results in the creation of a new past service base with respect to
such employer. Under such conditions, a period of some eleven and one-
third years is required to pay off the amount of the "premium skipped."
This raises the question as to what the status of an employee subject to
the restriction of Mimeograph 5717 is during this period. It may be
assumed that there is an ever increasing limit to the unrestricted maxi-
mum. In practice, however, the procedure followed has been to distrib-
ute to him the full amount of any payments due him, and to later run the
risk of encountering a problem with the Treasury Department for so
doing.
Similar problems can arise in the self-insured plan, or in the combina-
tion plan which employs ordinary life contracts and a side fund. Here
again, failure to make contributions sufficient to prevent the unfunded
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costs from rising can create a new past service base requiring the spread
of the deduction over the more than eleven year period. Just when, how-
ever, is one to determine that the unfunded past service liability has been
exceeded? If an employer contributes the minimum amount required by
Treasury PS 57, i.e., no more than normal cost plus interest on the un-
funded past service liability, it follows that the very next day the plan has
violated the requirements of Treasury PS 57 because there is an unpaid
portion of interest on the unfunded past service liability. Therefore, the
test usually made to determine whether there has been a case where the
unfunded past service liability has been exceeded is made on an annual
valuation date selected by the actuary. Section 404, however, stipulates
that a contribution made to a plan is deductible if made within the fiscal
year, and in the case of an accrual basis taxpayer, a contribution is deducti-
ble if made within the time prescribed by law for filing a federal income
tax return, including any extension thereof. For example, suppose that
the valuation date selected by an actuary is the first day of an employer's
fiscal year. Under such circumstances, the Code would permit an indi-
vidual employer to contribute some time within the ensuing fiscal year
on a deductible basis plus the period of time afterward for filing the re-
turn (including permitted extensions). Yet, a strict reading of PS 57
would require an interpretation to the effect: (1) that the plan is in a
state of bad grace, and is not qualified; (2) that interest earnings upon
the fund are subject to tax and distributions from the fund not subject
to the special provisions applying to distributions from qualified plans;
and (3) that Mimeograph 5717 would have to be invoked. Should
there be a later failure to contribute to the plan, it could be asserted
that there should have been a full vesting of the fund as upon termina-
tion by applying the provisions of Revenue Ruling 55-186. Obviously,
such results seem absurd. Accordingly, the Internal Revenue Service
agents have usually held that a contribution made to the plan within the
period of time prescribed by law for filing of a federal income tax return
for a particular year relates back to the valuation date, and that the plan
is still within a state of qualification.
DISCOVERY: INFORMATION TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE
TREASURY DEPARTMENT UPON TERMINATION OF A
QUALIFIED PLAN
The techniques of preventing discrimination by (a) controlling dis-
bursements upon termination of a qualified plan, and (b) regulating the
rate of contributions to a qualified plan during its lifetime so as to pre-
vent its dying of starvation were discussed in previous parts of this ar-
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tide.5 Whether there has been a violation of the rules which apply to
funding, and whether rules relating to restrictions on disbursement in the
event of early termination apply, will appear when certain information
is rendered to the Treasury Department upon the plan's termination.
There is comparatively little in the statute which deals with the ter-
mination of a pension plan. In 1938, section 165 (a) of the Revenue
Act was amended to require that an employer insert in his trust a
positive statement to the effect that prior to the satisfaction of all the
liabilities with respect to employees under the trust, no part of the corpus
or income of the trust would revert to the employer. This provision has
been carried forward into each succeeding Internal Revenue Code.
The rule is simple and comparatively easy to understand. The other
rules which have developed with respect to termination of the program
are products of administrative determination.52
In Treasury PS 56, published June 1946, the Service held that upon
learning of termination of a plan, the trustee should notify the Commis-
sioner of the termination before distribution of the assets. The reason
given by the Commissioner in the ruling was that a program might
qualify in one year but not in the next, and that, should it have failed to
have qualified, a liability for taxes upon trust income might be owing for
the years in which the trust did not qualify. This has placed an effective
brake upon disbursements of assets pending a determination by the Treas-
ury Department that the qualified status of the program has not been
impaired by its termination. In June 1947, the Commissioner published
PS 60 in which he detailed the information which would have to be sub-
mitted in the event that a plan terminated in order for a ruling to be
rendered as to whether the plan's termination affected any prior ruling
on qualification. The information currently required to be submitted
under Revenue Procedure 56-12, Exhibit A, is virtually identical to that
required to be submitted under PS 60. An examination of the informa-
tion required to be filed by Revenue Procedure 56-12 provokes considera-
tion of certain problems, tax and otherwise, which should not be over-
looked when dealing with terminating or curtailing a qualified deferred
payment profit-sharing plan or pension plan. An examination and dis-
cussion of each item required by the ruling is, therefore, helpful.
Item 1, Exhibit A - Revenue Procedure 56-12
Item 1, Exhibit A of Revenue Procedure 56-12"3 requires that there be
furnished "the date as of which the plan is terminated or curtailed."
51. See pp. 668 to 672 supra of this text.
52. See Young, supra note 48.
53. Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 1029.
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As noted previously, a pension or profit-sharing plan is, for Treasury
Department purposes, a permanent program. Pension plans seldom
stipulate that they will terminate at a particular date. The exception to
this occurs in certain labor negotiated pension plans.
As indicated earlier,54 the typical pension contract negotiated by the
United Steelworkers of America is not an agreement to maintain a per-
manent pension plan, but rather is an agreement to provide that those
employees who retire within the period specified by the contract will, for
their lifetime, receive certain pension benefits. Often, liability is not lim-
ited to the funds put into the plan's funding medium. Actually, because
of the "double document" arrangement prevalent among employers who
have negotiated such pension plans, termination for Treasury Department
purposes does not occur at the end of the contract period. What does
happen, however, is that the employer then normally renegotiates a new
contract with the union, and then for qualification purposes amends his
existing plan filed with the Treasury. The problems involved are not
Treasury problems but rather contract problems, for it was held in New
York City Omnibus Corp. v. Quill,5 that liability to continue the pension
payments to those who retired during the contract term does not end when
the contract term expires.
In the plan typically negotiated by the auto workers, the situation is
different in that the plan is permanent and the rate and type of benefits
are not subject to renegotiation during the term of the contract. Usually,
these plans provide for giving notice of a demand to negotiate with re-
spect to the plan at not less than a fixed number of days before the end
of the contract term. Failure of either party to demand the opening of
negotiations in this respect does not terminate the plan; instead, the plans
provide that they continue on a "year-to-year" basis, subject to giving the
prerequisite notice before the elapsed specified period of time occurring
on any anniversary of the first date as of which the program could have
been discontinued or modified had adequate timely notice been given.
Usually, even though the plant at which the covered employees were em-
ployed closes down, the UAW will insist on the plan's continuation until
the expiration date fixed by contract. This permits employees to go
upon the pension rolls as they satisfy the requirements for a pension. The
consequence is a swelling of the census of retired lives immediately be-
fore the plan terminates.
Assuming that the assets of the trust did not, upon dosing down of
the plant, exceed the reserves for the pensions of those who had previously
retired, it is obvious that the assets will not match the reserves for pen-
sions of a larger number of retired lives. Thus, having kept the plan
54. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
55. 297 N.Y. 852, 78 N.E.2d 867 (1948).
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open has worked to the detriment of those who retired, but to the ad-
vantage of those who did not. From an equitable standpoint, the result
is not as bad as it may seem, for it is not fair to reward one who retired
first in time with an advantage over one who could have retired with
the same age and service requirements, but did not.
Because pension programs are permanent, conscientious counsel may
well raise the question as to the applicability of the Rule Against Per-
petuities in this field. Actually, it is questionable whether the Rule
Against Perpetuities applies at all, inasmuch as a large number of states
have passed statutes which specifically exempt from the Rule Against
Perpetuities applicable in that state any pension or profit-sharing fund
or plan. Even in the absence of the specific statutory exemption, it has
been stated that
as to pension trusts governed by laws that do not contain such provi-
sions (referring to statutes exempting plans from the Rule Against
Perpetuities), one should note that a trust may, without being invalid,
continue beyond the period prescribed by the rule against perpetuities
if the trustee or some other person or persons (such as the employer)
has the power to terminate this trust within the period. 6
If there is any. question as to the validity of the statutes which exempt
pension and profit-sharing trusts from the application of the Rule Against
Perpetuities, and of the inapplicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities
because of the power of the employer to terminate the trust at any time,
counsel would be well advised to consider at the establishment of the plan
whether the rule is applicable. The rule is customarily phrased as: "no
interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one
years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.""7  The
phrase "if at all" has puzzled the law student who is required to under-
stand the rule more than the practitioner who slavishly copies phrases to
cope with the rule; it is customarily interpreted as meaning that an
interest must vest within the period prescribed by the rule if it ever is to
vest. 'It does not necessarily follow from the rule that an interest must
vest. Hence, the Rule Against Perpetuities is not one which requires that
a trust terminate within any particular period of time. Whether there
is a rule which affects the duration of the trust is an open question. There-
fore, since the rule does not require that a trust terminate within any
particular period of time, the conditions under which a pension is to vest
under a trust must be determined. Obviously, it will vest for such per-
sons as reach normal retirement age, and obviously this will occur within
the lifetime of those employees who are alive on the effective date of the
plan's adoption. It is just as dear, however, that an individual could be
56. Patterson, op. cit, supra note 20, at 174.
57. Iauritzen, Perpetuities and Pension Trusts, 24 TAXES 519 (1946).
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born one day after the adoption of the plan and hired many years later.
Under the rule in Leake v. Robinson,8 the gift to the class would fail
since the members of the class could not be definitely determined at the
time that it was made. However, it has been argued by one scholar that to
apply the rule in this manner is to ignore the basis of the formation of
the rule. 9 The rule, according to Mr. Lauritzen, was developed to pre-
vent unreasonable restraints upon alienation. It is a rule developed to
cope with a result under family trust law which the courts did not feel
was socially desirable. There is ample evidence from other cases that
where the socially undesirable results were not created, the courts would
not apply the rule. Lauritzen cites such examples as business trusts,
commercial mortgages, options to purchase leases, and charitable trusts.6"
Also, while Lauritzen cites several instances in which the court rejected
the contention that the charitable trust exemption to the Rule Against
Perpetuities applied to trusts is similar to pension trusts (such as one
in which property was left to maintain the settlor's working men),
these cases are really not good authority for the proposition that a
pension trust is subject to the rule. Such an attempt to classify a pen-
sion trust within a recognized "pigeon-hole" ignores the fact that a pen-
sion trust does not fit into one of the older established "pigeon-holes,"
but into a newly fashioned one. So long as there is nothing socially un-
desirable about a pension plan - in fact there is legislative encourage-
ment of it - and so long as there is statutory regulation of the pension
trust, it should follow that the Rule Against Perpetuities will not be held
to apply to such a trust where the rule is one of judicial interpretation.
Obviously, where a state statute, such as in Ohio, stipulates the conditions
under which interests must vest, a court may make reasonable exemptions
from the application of the rule.
The rule must be watched, for in some older trusts clauses appear to
the effect that the trust will terminate within twenty-one years after the
last to die of certain employees named in the trust agreement. This raises
the question as to whether it is possible to cut off an inchoate right to a
vested interest in a share of the trust corpus should the employer amend
the trust. In other words, the question is whether an employee could at
some future time claim that it is beyond the power of the employer to
eliminate such a clause from his plan by amendment. This has not been
answered by the text authorities, but it would not seem likely that anyone
would be so entitled. The interest can arise only upon the happening of
a contingency, and provided the revision in the instrument will be made
sometime in advance of the occurrence of the contingency, an individual
58. 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
59. Lauritzen, supra note 57, at 519.
60. Id. at 526-27.
[Vol 15:667
Young, Pension Plans
should not be allowed to argue that an employer is required to terminate
the program so as to vest him with a share of the fund where the pro-
gram would have socially desirable attributes.
Item 2, Exhibit A - Revenue Procedure 56-12
Item 2, Exhibit A requires that there be furnished a "statement setting
forth the reason and circumstances relative to the (proposed) termination
or curtailment."
It was noted in part 1 of this analysis 1 that the Service had, in the
early days of the modern era of pension planning, feared that plans would
be set up as collapsible tax devices. As a result, the Regulations2 provide
that while the employer may reserve the right to change or terminate the
plan, the abandonment of the plan for any reason other than business
necessity within a few years after it has taken effect will be evidence that
the plan was not from its inception a bona fide program for the exclusive
benefit of all employees. The consequences of a retroactive disallowance
following failure to rebut the presumption of lack of permanence can be
measured by the following language of a text book written on the sub-
ject of pensions in 1946.
If a plan is retroactively disapproved, the results may be drastic. The
employer's contributions for all years not barred by the statute of limi-
tations will be disallowed if the rights of the participants are forfeitable.
Thus, deficiencies for at least three years could be assessed against the
employer; and if gross income has been understated by 25%, five years
would be open. Although the employer's contributions would still be
deductible if the rights of the employees were nonforfeitable, provided,
of course, that they constituted reasonable compensation, the employees
would be taxable retroactively on such amounts for all years not barred
by the statute of limitations. If they did not pay such tax, it is possible
that the employer might be called on to pay it, since he would not have
withheld tax, as required by the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943.
Likewise, he may be called on to pay delinquent Social Security and
unemployment taxes. Further, if the plan is retroactively disqualified,
the employer may find himself declared guilty of having granted salary
increases without approval and be involved in serious Salary and Wage
Stabilization violations. Also the employer may not only lose the tax
and interest on the funds contributed but the funds themselves which
have been paid or applied irrevocably to the trust or the beneficiaries of
the plan. For a while the Commissioner allowed payments contingent
on approval and subject to recapture, but this privilege was withdrawn
after the original approval under the Revenue Act of 1942. It is also to
be noted that the two year carry-back and carry-forward provisions of
the Code may assist in the continuance of pension plans.63
61. See p. 668 supra of this text.
62. Reg. § 1.401-1(b) (2 (1956), as amended, T.D. 6675, 1963 INT. Ray. BULL. No. 41,
at 37, as amended, T.D. 6722, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 22, at 8.
63. CLAmR, PRoFIT SrAIwunG AND PEqsIoN PLANs (LAw AND TAXES) 125-26 (1946).
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The severity of the penalty for failure to rebut the presumption of
lack of bona fides was at once apparent to both the Service and the prac-
titioner, and it became clear that certain hazards of doing business which
were beyond the control of the employer and which would result in the
termination of the qualified plan, ought to be considered differently from
other circumstances which were within the control of the employer. Hence,
in 1944, the Service published PS 29 which expanded the earlier version
of section 1.401-(b) (2) of the Regulations. The Service stated that
the ruling was not intended "to penalize the employer, who having set
up a plan in good faith, abandons it after a few years because of in-
solvency or bankruptcy or because adverse business conditions beyond
its control would make it unreasonably burdensome to continue the re-
quired payments under the plan." While there is a repetition of the
concept that drastic circumstances must exist, there is nevertheless pres-
ent a reassurance within the publication of this ruling that not every plan
which ended after a short life would necessarily be attacked as a sham.
Later, in August 1945, the Service stated in Treasury PS 52 that the
term business necessity "has reference to adverse business conditions
not within the control of the employer under which it is not possible to
continue the plan." The Service stated in PS 52 that it would not look
strictly upon those situations where the plan of one employer was ter-
minated on the acquisition of its assets by a new corporation.
Mimeograph 61364 gave substantial breadth to the term business
necessity. This ruling states, inter alia:
[T]wo basic principals, however, affect the determination to be made,
namely, the existence of a valid reason for the termination or change
consistent with the assumption that the plan from its inception had been
a bona fide program for the exclusive benefit of employees in general
and complied with the requirements of 165(a) in other respects, not
only at the adoption of the plan but also throughout its entire operation,
inclusive of the termination. "
The reader will find it interesting to note that in a matter of a few
months, the Service had progressed in its published philosophy from
the extreme point of requiring proof of drastic business necessity, to the
softer position of demanding proof of a valid business reason for termina-
tion. Some examples stated as being valid business reasons were, "bank-
ruptcy, insolvency, change of ownership in an arms length transaction,
a bona fide and substantial change of stock holdings and management,
and financial inability to continue meeting the cost of the plan."
At the time Mimeograph 6136 was issued, the Service maintained
that in order for a profit-sharing plan to qualify, it must provide a for-
64. 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 58.
65. Id. at 59. (Emphasis added.)
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mula committing the employer in advance to contribute a share of his
profits to the plan. This raises the question as to whether there is an
interrelationship between this rule and the "valid business reason" rule.
It is obvious that a rule requiring a predetermined formula may be cir-
cumvented by the mere device of establishing a plan with a stipulated
formula, and then amending it yearly or at other frequent intervals so as
to alter the amount of profit being placed in the plan. Several examples
were set forth in Mimeograph 6136 as to conditions which the Service
would or would not construe as presenting a valid business reason for
terminating a plan. As to those not presenting a valid business reason
the Service indicated that it would regard the making of an amendment
which would reduce the percentage of profit to be contributed as a cur-
tailment of a program sufficient to warrant a determination that the
presumption of lack of bona fides had not been overcome. The prob-
lem arising after such a determination was presented to the court
in E. R. Wagner Mfg. Co."G The Tax Court took the position that the
revision in the formula could be made inasmuch as the revised formula
provided for a contribution of sufficient dimension to achieve the social
purposes designed to be encouraged by the statute. The Lincoln Electric
case was cited with approval by the court. It is to be noted that the
court's reasoning is very similar to that presented in the Lincoln Electric
decision, namely, that one must look to the transaction in question to
determine if the statutory scheme is being fulfilled. Of course, it is one
thing to look at a plan that is continuing and say that, as modified but
continuing even though curtailed, it fits into the pattern contemplated by
Congress, and it is another to look at a terminated plan and say that its
termination does not impair the prior determination of qualification be-
cause during its lifetime, it fulfilled the statutory scheme. In other
words, one would expect that a higher standard would be required in
proving that there is a valid business reason to terminate a plan than
would be required when the transaction in question is an amendment,
reducing or otherwise curtailing benefits where the purported justification
for the action is allegedly that the purposes contemplated by Congress
were in fact achieved. In practice, this has proved to be the case.
The requirement of proving bona fides is related to the theory de-
veloped within the Treasury Department that the plans being adopted
during World War II were merely surreptitious schemes to escape the
impact of excess profits tax. Both Mimeograph 6136 and the E. R.
Wagner case refer to the reduction, at the time the amendment was
made, of the amount of tax to be levied on corporate income. It is
obvious that the higher the corporate income tax, the lower the net cost of
a deductible contribution to the employer. The answer to this philosophy
66. 18 T.C. 657 (1952), acq., 1953-1 CU. BULL. 6.
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is that the law permits financing of these plans at a rate that is con-
venient to the taxpayer regardless of the tax rate at the time of the con-
tribution. Contrary to the generally accepted rule in American tax
law that deductions must fall in a particular year without being con-
trolled in their size by the whim of the taxpayer, there appears in the
pension field, statutory permission designed to encourage the corporate
taxpayer to take his deductions with a relative degree of convenience in
order to foster a socially desirable scheme of deferred retirement pro-
graming. A few examples are illustrative of this point.
(a) Section 404(a) (1) gives three6" alternatives for claiming a
deduction. Nothing in the statute prohibits the taxpayer from
shifting from one of the methods to the other in different
years, although, as a matter of practice, this is unusual. As
a matter of fact, when the Commissioner sought to establish
that the last of the three alternatives superimposed a maximum
on the amount claimable under either of the other two, his
contention was regarded without merit in the courts."
(b) Use of the open-end mortgage method of financing a pension
plan is permitted within the minimum fixed by Treasury PS 57
and the maximum allowed by section 404(a) (1) (C). By
contributing the maximum in a period of high tax and little
or nothing in a period of low tax, there is a device interrelating
ruling and statute for timing the contribution to the ability
and need to pay which could be perverted into timing the
contribution to the tax rate.
(c) Section 404(a) (3) (A) permits a sponsoring employer who
has contributed less than 15 per cent of his payroll to a profit-
sharing plan in one year to contribute in the next year, over
and above the normal 15 per cent allotment for that year, an
amount equal to the excess of 15 per cent of the payroll of
the covered employees over the amount contributed in the
next preceding taxable year. Here too, there is a device which
could be perverted into timing contribution to tax rate.
That possibilities of abuse exist should not result in a presumption
that there is abuse. A high tax rate in a time of business prosperity is
but one facet of the environment of the times; also present is the enthusi-
asm of business men that "good times" will continue. Therefore, a re-
67. The deduction may be claimed under INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 404(a) (1) (A), (B),
or (C) [hereinafter cited as CODE §] suggesting three alternatives. In practice, they are
customarily so regarded. Technically, however, CoDE § 404 (a) (1) (B) is regarded as an
extended limitation of CODE § 404(a) (1) (A). Cf. Reg. § 1.404 (a)-5(b) (1956).
68. Saalfield Publishing Co., 11 T.C. 756 (1948), acq., 1952-2 CuM. BULL. 3, withdraw-
ing nonacq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 6; Philadelphia Suburban Transp. Co. v. Smith, 105 F. Supp.
650 (E.D. Pa. 1952). See T.D. 6189, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 972.
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duction in tax rates in and of itself should not be presumed to be the
reason for reduction in benefits under a qualified plan, but rather as one
of the elements to determine when there is a valid business reason for
modifying or terminating it. A statement to the effect that "a plan
which is set up during years of high tax rates and is abandoned within
a few years without a valid business reason when profits fall off is not
within the intent of section 401 (a)" 69 is too bald. As a matter of fact,
an argument can be made that a reduction in tax rates presents a valid
business reason for curtailing benefits under a program.
The 1941 amendments to section 165 (a) of the 1939 Internal
Revenue Code had been preceded by a congressional study. Senate
Resolution 215 of the 75th Congress, proposed by Senator Vandenberg
of Michigan, authorized the study of the pension and profit-sharing
plans then current. The study attempted to determine what encourage-
ment the federal government could give to the adoption of pension
and profit-sharing plans, including "the grant of compensatory tax
exemptions and tax awards when profit-sharing is voluntarily estab-
lished."7  The Committee concluded that it was not practical to apply
incentive taxation to the profit-sharing motive. 1 However, it cannot be
denied that the tax rates which existed during World War II and which
continued in the post war period have operated as a strong inducement
to encourage high paid executives in control of the destinies of corpora-
tions to adopt pension plans. 2
Although one may deplore the selfish motive which has encouraged
the adoption of thousands of retirement programs, the fact is that they
have been adopted and that Congress has not seen fit to make any change
in the rules even though it could have done so when it revised the 1954
Internal Revenue Code and had before it several proposals for making
modifications that would have severely limited this inducement. There-
fore, a minimization of tax rates should justify a revised attitude in main-
taining the plan on its old basis. At this point, "valid business reason"
and "fulfillment of social objective" are theories that take different
routes.
The lenient administrative attitude toward curtailment 3 has not pre-
vailed when dealing with plan terminations. However, while the
court has upheld the Commissioner's requirement that qualifica-
69. Rev. Rul. 57-163 pt. 2b, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 128, 131.
70. S. REP. No. 610, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1939).
71. S. REP. No. 610, supra note 70, at 6.
72. See Young & Silverman, Tax Advantages of Retirement Plans, 7 CLEv.-MAR. L REv.
541 (1958).
73. A statement that private benefit decreases are justified by social security benefit increases
has often been accepted by the Internal Revenue Service as a valid business reason for curtail-
ment.
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tion may be maintained only upon establishment of a valid business
reason,"4 the court has found that each questioned transaction was af-
fected with a valid business reason. Other valid business reasons accepted
by the courts for termination are: (a) the taxpayer's erroneous belief at
the inception of a plan of the position which the Service had of the tax-
payer's right to terminate or curtail a plan, and (b) failure of the plan
to accomplish the objectives for which it was adopted. The few cases
decided have indicated that the courts do not accept the original strict
attitude of the Service. However, these cases, while unimportant in
themselves, are significant because the opinions are demonstrative of the
attitude which the judiciary is likely to take of the problem.
In Ingram v. Riddell,75 the pension plan which was the subject of liti-
gation was funded by individual, level premium policies. Ninety per cent
of the premium was paid by the employer, and the balance by the em-
ployees. Faced with a fifty per cent reduction in profits five years after
it had adopted the plan, the employer sought to amend the plan by in-
creasing the employee contribution. Management had been led to believe
by the insurance men who had persuaded the employer to institute the
plan in 1943 that such a revision was acceptable to the Service.76 On
being advised that the government would contest the revision, the com-
pany terminated the plan. Litigation followed; the court held that
the plan was terminated for business necessity and that the original quali-
fied status had not been lost. The court separated its conclusions of law
from its findings of fact; hence, the opinion does not interrelate the facts
to the conclusion. However, one may conjecture: (a) that five years
was sufficient to minimize the standards of proof required to show a valid
business reason inasmuch as the court's "conclusions of law" state that
the plan was in operation for more than a few years, and upholds the
Regulations pertaining to presumptions of lack of bona fides because
of failure to be in existence more than a few years; (b) that mis-
understanding of the legal rules as to rights of curtailment at the time of
the program's adoption influences the standards to be employed in deter-
mining whether there is a "business necessity" when the plan terminates;
and/or (c) that there was a "business necessity" without reference to the
74. In other areas of tax law, the Internal Revenue Service has adopted the test of "business
purpose" to determine whether a transaction is legitimate. For example, a corporate reorga-
nization does not qualify as a tax reorganization within the scope of CODE 5 368, even though
it meets the literal tests of the statute, unless the transaction has a valid business purpose.
See Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947); Adams v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737
(1947); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
75. 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1184 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
76. Cf. Mim. 6136, pt. 5, 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 58, 60 which provides: "An amendment
requiring employee contributions to provide the same benefits which previously were provided
exclusively by employer contributions results in a curtailment. The mere fact that benefits
are reduced does not necessarily render the amendment ...objectionable."
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misunderstanding where a plan had been in existence for more than a
few years.
On two other occasions the courts considered the "business necessity"
rule. In Blume Knitwear, Inc.,"7 the taxpayer had adopted a deferred pay-
ment profit-sharing plan during World War II to augment the payment
of current compensation since increases in salaries were prohibited by
government action. Publications of the Salary Stabilization Unit indi-
cated that the method of disbursement delineated in the plan (payment
in a series of installments after conclusion of the War) would be accepta-
ble, but subsequently, after adoption of the plan and payment of the in-
itial contribution, the Salary Stabilization Unit changed its position and
refused to approve the stipulated method of disbursing in installments.
Although the plan could have been amended to comply with the position
of the Salary Stabilization Unit, the employees, according to the testimony
of the president of the company, would have been unwilling to accept
the plan. Accordingly, the company exercised its reserved rights under
the plan and discontinued the making of contributions. Later, to obtain
Internal Revenue approval of the program, presumably for purposes of
claiming a deduction for the contributions already made, amendments,
including those to implement the thirty per cent rule, were made. The
Internal Revenue, not yet apprised of the discontinuance, issued a favor-
able determination letter reversing a prior unfavorable determination.
On learning of the discontinuance, the Service took the view that it had
been deceived by the lack of disclosure, and withdrew the approval letter.
A tone of wounded indignation permeates portions of the revocation let-
ter which are reprinted in the opinion. The court stated that even grant-
ing the government's position that the plan did not terminate for business
necessity, the plan had nevertheless been a bona fide program established
for the exclusive benefit of the employees and was terminated only when
the purpose envisaged by it, i.e., compensatory relief to overcome salary
"freezes" imposed by the government, could not be fulfilled."
77. 9 T.C. 1179 (1947).
78. In P.S. No. 68, published July 3, 1951, the Service held that a plan adopted during
the Korean crisis could provide that payments thereto would be recovered if the plan failed
to meet the Wage Stabilization requirements under the Defense Production Act of 1950.
In P.S. No. 47, published February 21, 1945, after the adoption of the Blume Knitwear plan,
the Service ruled that it would no longer accept plans which contained clauses that contributions
were recoverable if a plan failed to meet approval. Thus, in the Blume Knitwear case, the
taxpayer could have, under procedures then acceptable, conditioned his payment on govern-
ment approval. Perhaps the obdurate position of the Internal Revenue is understandable
from that point of view.
Newly adopted plans may now again have clauses permitting reversion of employer con-
tributions should the plan fail to qualify. See Rev. Rul. 59-309, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 117.
The issue has been litigated in the courts and the taxpayers' position sustained. See, e.g.,
Meldrum & Fewsmith, Inc., 20 T.C. 790 (1953), acq., 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 5. Therefore,
Treasury P.S. No. 47 may be considered effectively overruled. The rule now seems to be
that where the contingency for reversion of a payment is within the control of the government,
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This rather lengthy description of a relatively unimportant case is
presented only to indicate again that the Tax Court has not always ac-
cepted the "business necessity" rule as an absolute. The case illustrates
that abandonment within a few years after adoption without proof of
business necessity merely creates the presumption that the program was
not bona fide, but the presumption is rebuttable and the courts will accept
evidence of failure of the program to meet its objectives as proof of the
bona fides. This, it should be noted, is not the same as stating that fail-
ure to meet the objectives is a "valid business reason." Such a rule was
to await the case of Kane Chevrolet Co.7 There, the plan involved was
terminated about one year after it had been adopted. The reason given
the government was that the plan failed to accomplish the objectives for
which it had been adopted, namely, reduction in labor turnover and em-
ployee satisfaction. Indeed, the opinion states that employees were more
anxious to receive immediate compensation than pensions. The Service
claimed that the program was not entitled to qualification since the tax-
payer had failed to show business necessity for termination. Citing Mime-
ograph 6136, Judge Opper, who also rendered the opinion in the Blume
Knitwear case, noted that "business necessity" is a phrase synonymous
with "valid business reason," and held that failure to meet objectives is a
valid business reason to terminate a plan.
To summarize, a plan terminated within a few years after its adoption
must establish that it started as a bona fide program for employees. The
presumption that it was not bona fide may be rebutted by proof of a
valid business reason for termination. The courts accept as proof of a
valid business reason: (a) erroneous belief of the Service's position on
the subject at the inception of the plan, and (b) failure of the plan to
accomplish the objectives for which it was adopted. Casting doubt on
the doctrine that a "valid business reason" must be proved to rebut the
presumption of lack of bona fides, are the cases which have held that
evidence of the plan's failure to meet its objectives will establish bona
fides, if not business necessity, and the holding that one must look to see
whether the plan attained or approached attainment of any of the objec-
tives of Congress in establishing the basis for tax deductible programs
under section 4 01 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The courts have
and all steps taken by the taxpayer have been to plan reversion beyond the control of the
taxpayer, the plan is final enough to qualify.
Quaere: What of an amendment adopted subject to approval of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice? The reasoning of the cases overruling P.S. No. 47 would indicate that in such a situation
the placing of reversion within the control of the government and not the taxpayer would also
permit qualification. The question also arises as to whether the deduction would be allowed
if the determination letter stipulating approval is not received before the close of the taxable
year. Cf. Reg. S 1.404 (a) -1 (c), which provides that all facts necessary to perfect an accrual
must be established before year end. To date, the issue has not been raised.
79. 32 T.C 596 (1959).
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failed to confirm the Service's strict attitude which waned as the excess
profits tax was removed, and as the Service abandoned its original posi-
tion of requiring a predetermined formula.
Item 3, Exhibit A - Revenue Procedure 56-12
Item 3, Exhibit A of Revenue Procedure 56-12 requires:
a tabulation in columnary form showing the information specified
below with respect to each of the twenty-five highest paid employees
at the time of termination or curtailment (or, in case of a proposed
termination or curtailment at the most recent anniversary of the plan)
listed in the order of their compensation, and for all other employees
as a group (showing the number in such group), covered by the plan:
(a) Name.
(b) Whether an officer.(c) Percentage of each class of stock owned directly or indirectly
by the employee or members of his family.(d) Data, separately for the year in which the plan is terminated
or curtailed and for each of the preceding years of the plan's operation
(not in excess of 5, unless required) with respect to:
(i) Total compensation, other than deferred compensation.
(ii) Employer's contribution.(iii) Employee's share in forfeitures.
(iv) Employee's contributions.
(e) Total for each of the columns under (d) above, for each year.
(f) Summary columns showing in aggregate (totalled horizon-
tally) for all years, with respect to each of the employees listed and
all others, data similar to the items called for under (d) above.(g) A final column showing the total value of benefits dis-
tributed or to be distributed to each of the twenty-five highest paid
employees and to all others. 80
The information required above should be compared with the in-
formation required to be submitted upon qualifying a plan when claim-
ing tax deductions under Regulation 1.404(a)-2 (a) (3). That Regula-
tion requires that a schedule be submitted, customarily referred to as the
twenty-five highest schedule, listing the information (similar to that
listed above) for the first taxable year with respect to which a deduction
is claimed. Once that schedule is submitted it is not required to be sub-
mitted again pursuant to Regulation 1.4 04(a)-(2) (b) (2) for any
subsequent taxable year, except to the extent of showing in the tabulation
"such information with respect to the employees who, at any time in
the taxable year, own, directly or indirectly, more than five per cent of
the voting stock, considering stock so owned by an individual's spouse
or minor lineal descendents as owned by the individual for this purpose."
Furthermore, Regulation 1.404(a)-(2) (b) (2) stipulates that the Dis-
trict Director may request that the information required by Regulation
80. Rev. Proc 56-12, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 1034.
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1.404 (a) -2(a) (3) shall be filed more frequently. That Regulation
also contains the statement that the full schedule need not be filed "so
long as the plan and the method of basis of allocation have not changed."
Within the scope of these reserve powers, the District Directors have
required the filing of schedules whenever amendments have been made
to plans. To some extent the filing of this information has been limited
to times when an amendment has been filed for the reason that the in-
formation required by the schedule is posted from the data submitted by
the taxpayer to a form used by the Service and known as the 517-A
Form. That form requires the submission of information with respect to
the five highest paid employees and consolidated information as to the
twenty-five highest paid employees. It is to be noted that section
1.404(a)-2(e) permits the District Director to waive the filing of the
information required if he finds it unnecessary in a particular case. For
this reason, the District Director has frequently waived the filing of the
information required by the twenty-five highest schedule in union nego-
tiated programs. The District Directors have also frequently waived the
filing of this information in salaried pension plans in which the benefit
is computed at some minimal rate amounting to less than $125 per year.
For the same reasons, the several District Directors have normally waived
the filing of the detailed, lengthy schedule required by Item 3, Exhibit
A of Revenue Procedure 56-12, in instances where the plans were of the
union negotiated type, or were salaried programs having minimal bene-
fits.
Nevertheless, because annual filing of the schedule is not required,
and properly so, the assembling of the data sufficient to prepare the
consolidated schedule for a five year period for purposes of Item 3, Ex-
hibit A of Revenue Procedure 56-12 is tedious and time consuming to
the taxpayer and his agent. Because of the District Directors' broad
power to waive filing of the information, it is desirable to gain an
insight into the original reasoning of the Service for requiring the infor-
mation to be filed, and from this to determine whether it is proper to
request that filing of the consolidated schedule be waived when the plan
terminates. A reproduction of the twenty-five highest schedule which
is filed upon securing qualification of the plan appears in an appendix to
this article. The following discussion is in reference to the column num-
bers in that schedule.
Columns 1 to 6.-The statute stipulates that a plan shall not dis-
criminate in favor of stockholders, supervisory employees, or highly com-
pensated employees. Therefore, the information as to whether the em-
ployee is an officer, the percentage of stock which he owns, and whether
his principal duties consist in supervising the work of other employees
will help determine whether the program has been weighted in favor
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of the group in favor of whom discrimination may not exist pursuant
to the law. Some of the questions are not always simple to answer.
Column 2.-Whether or not a person is a corporate officer can be
determined by an objective test. However, questions often arise as to
whether an assistant secretary is an officer. Here, a subjective test may
have to be employed in place of an objective test based upon the title in
determining whether the individual has sufficient responsibilities within
an organization to be classified as an officer. Usually, the traditional
corporate officers - President, Vice President, Secretary and Treasurer
- will be the only ones who will be indicated as being officers upon the
form.
Column 3.-Regulation 1.404(e) -2 (b) (2) indicates that the class
of stock owned directly by the employee or members of his family refers
to the stock owned by the individual's spouse and minor lineal descen-
dants. It is probable that stock of the company held in a private trust of
which he is the settlor is likewise the stock owned indirectly by the family.
Column 4.-In answering the question as to whether the principal
duties of the individual consist in supervising the work of other employees,
a practical yardstick has been employed in holding that one's principal
duties consist in supervising the work of other persons if one-half of the
time of the individual is actually spent in a supervisory capacity. Merely
because one has the right to direct the activities of others does not mean
that his principal duties are supervisory in nature.
Column 7: Inserting the Information.-Entering the information
upon the form as to the annual compensation of the individual involved
often causes problems since the Regulation requires that there be in-
serted the compensation paid or accrued for the taxable year. It is to be
noted that column 9 requires that sub-columns be filled in to indicate
the amount of pension cost or share of profit allocated to the par-
ticipant in that year. A conscientious agent will frequently check the
indicated share of profit or amount of expected pension under col-
umn 11 against the compensation and against the formula in the plan
to determine whether the amount is correct. The trouble arises from
the fact that plans frequently employ, for administrative convenience,
a definition of the term "compensation" to determine the amount
of pension or share of profit contributed that differs substantially from
the amount of compensation paid within the taxable year. For example,
it is not unusual to find that the rate of pay in effect on a particular date
during the year is annualized (multiplied by 12 if a monthly rate, 52
if a weekly rate, or 2080 if an hourly rate) in order to determine the
compensation for plan purposes. In other instances, particularly in those
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cases involving salesmen, an average of earnings over a three or five year
period is not uncommon because of wide fluctuations. Moreover, column
7 (i) requires that consolidated basic plus overtime compensation be in-
serted, though the plan may compute benefits on basic compensation
alone, again causing an unexplained deviation. Under such circum-
stances, it is advisable to insert an extra column on the form that is sub-
mitted when seeking initial qualification of the plan to demonstrate the
amounts from which the computations are made.
Column 7: Did the Plan Cover the Highly Compensated?-When
the Service reviews the plan upon termination to determine whether it
has, within the language of Mimeograph 6136, met the qualification
requirements during its lifetime, a panoramic view is spread before
the agent by the schedule for five years required by Item 3, Exhibit
A, Revenue Procedure 56-12 to determine whether in the five year
period, the program has resulted in the inclusion of persons who are
officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compensated employees.
At this point, it is well to consider what the Service has in mind in
determining whether the program discriminates in favor of "highly
compensated" employees. It is to be noted that the statute provides that
a plan shall not be considered to discriminate in favor of officers, share-
holders, supervisors or highly compensated employees merely because it
covers salaried or clerical employees. Inasmuch as the disjunctive "or"
is used in the statute instead of the conjunctive "and," it is obvious that
a plan could cover salaried employees without covering clerical em-
ployees. In the Congressional Reports, the Senate indicated that such
a provision was designed to permit qualification so long as the program
did not result in discrimination. In referring to this provision, Regulation
1.401-1 (b) (3) clouds the issue with the language that "this does not
mean that a plan containing provisions may not be discriminatory in
actual operation."
Legislative history, as noted in the earlier discussion of Mimeograph
5717, supports the theory that a comparison of pay scales of the em-
ployees included in the plan with the pay scales of the group excluded
from the plan is not an exclusive test in the determination of whether
the plan discriminates in favor of the highly compensated. The 1942 Bill
amending section 165 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code stated that a
plan could not qualify if it discriminated in favor of employees whose
compensation was greater than that of other employees. The statute as
passed provides that a program may not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees. This shift from the comparative term, "greater,"
to the adverb, "highly," is significant. Furthermore, it is common knowl-
edge that salaried personnel customarily earn more than non-salaried
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personnel.81 Studies prepared by the Wharton School of Business for
the U.S. Department of Labor in 1950 demonstrate this. There are
therefore two tests, both subjective: (1) whether the individuals cov-
ered by the plan are "highly" compensated according to the contemporary
standards of the community within which they draw compensation,
or (2) whether they are "highly" compensated as determined by com-
paring the pay scales of persons excluded and included in the plan.
More weight should be given, because of the legislative history, to the
contemporary standards of the community in which the compensation
is received than to the intra-company pay scale test, but both have a
significant effect upon the decision.
It should be noted, however, that although the plan may have origi-
nally qualified, large rates of turnover among lower paid employees may
have resulted during some of the years in question in the maintenance
of a plan for supervisory personnel, shareholders, officers, and highly
compensated employees.82 The consolidated five year schedule will
now apprise the Service of facts about which it may not have known,
except with respect to five per cent stockholders. A determination may
be made from the data that by operation of facts over which the tax-
payer has had no control, the program has become discriminatory as
that concept is employed by the Service. The Ryan School case 3 held
that a plan had not become discriminatory because of the change in facts
over which the taxpayer had had no control. In that case, a program
that started out with a large number of employees, ended with only a
few, and most of these were shareholders or officers. Before extending
the Ryan School doctrine too far, it should be noted that in that case there
were no additional contributions made once the fact pattern had changed.
If a taxpayer finds that his plan covers only a few people within the
group, but he nevertheless continues to make contributions with respect
to those people, it would seem arguable, from the Service's standpoint,
that the Ryan School doctrine is inapplicable. The taxpayer is then faced
with a dilemma. If the plan is terminated, and the termination occurs
within a few years after adoption of the program, the taxpayer must come
forward and prove that business necessity was the cause of his action and
that the program was bona fide; if he fails to discontinue, any further con-
tributions are at his peril, leaving in the hands of the Service a Sword of
Damocles that may fall at anytime on his purported right to claim the
81. For judicial recognition of this commonly known fact see H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191
F.2d 831, 840 n.5 (6th Cir. 1951) wherein it is stated: "but being hourly employees, [their
compensation] was certainly much less than the income of the executive employees."
.82. Mir. 6136, para. 1, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 58.
83. 24 T.C. 127 (1955).
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deduction. At this juncture the taxpayer must take his choice; he can
either resubmit for re-qualification, or let the matter ride.
Column 7: Unreasonable Compensation.-Aside from the question
which arises as to whether the program in fact covered a non-discrimina-
tory group during the period of time covered under the schedule required
by Item 3, Exhibit A 4 it is quite probable that the agents will check the
employer's contributions in column 9 at the inception of the plan, and
on the consolidated schedule pursuant to paragraph 3 (d) (ii). The
purpose of this check is to determine, on behalf of each employee, whether
that contribution, when combined with the compensation under column
7 paid to the employee in each of the years involved, was an unreasonable
amount of compensation so as not to be deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. Some background may explain the problem.
Section 23 (p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended,
read in part as follows:
If contributions are paid by an employer to or under a stock bonus, pen-
sion, profit-sharing or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid or accrued
on account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such
compensation, such contributions or compensation shall not be de-
ductible under subsection (a) but shall be deductible, if deductible under
subsection (a), without regard to this subsection, under this subsection
but only to the following extent.. .. 85
This very confusing language which was cited by the Republican candi-
date for president during the 1944 campaign as an example of the unneces-
sary extreme to which tax law language could go, means simply that
"employer contributions must fall within a class of expense deductible
under section 23(a), and such contributions are allowable deductions
only to the extent provided in section 23 (p).,"6 To have been allowable
as deductions under section 23 (a), the taxpayer was required to establish
that employer contributions under the plan constituted reasonable com-
pensation for personal services," for section 23(a) provided that "all
ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred during the tax-
able year in carrying on any trade or business, including a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually
rendered," would be allowed as a deduction in computing net income.
Dean Griswold of Harvard University has argued88 that the history of
the statute shows that it should not properly be construed as authorizing
the Commissioner to limit the deduction to salaries actually paid, but,
84. Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 1034.
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23 (p), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404).
86. DEARING, INDusTRIAL PENsIoNs 292 (1954).
87. H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951).




on the contrary, the phrase was intended to allow the deduction of a rea-
sonable allowance for salaries even though they had not actually been
paid. The Department's attitude toward this contention, and indeed that
of the courts, can be most politely expressed as treating it as though it
does not exist. In general, the question of the propriety of the deduction
of a reasonable allowance for salaries is most commonly raised in con-
nection with closely held corporations where salaries were paid to stock-
holder employees or stockholder officers or relatives or to friends.8" It
has been stated that
in determining whether salaries are reasonable a great many factors
are taken into account. Among the more important are: the nature of
the services rendered; the salaries paid in prior years for the same type
of work; whether the salary is on a contingent basis - a larger amount
may be reasonable if the compensation is contingent; the amount the
employee could have obtained from another employer for the same
work. If large salaries are paid to employees or officers who are also
stockholders, and if the salaries bear a dose relationship to the amount
of stock owned, the Commissioner can be expected to question a part
of the salary payments on the ground that they represent a concealed
distribution of dividends.9 0
Prior to the 1942 amendments of the Internal Revenue Code, non-
discrimination was not a criterion for qualifying a tax-exempt program.
If a contribution made to a program constituted reasonable compensation,
it was deductible.9 The influence of this concept probably induced an
early writer on the subject of pension plans to comment in 1946 that
it was anticipated that most of the questions "arising as to the deductibility
of contributions to the employees' trusts will pertain to the requirement
of reasonableness."92  This point was illustrated by a case arising under
the law existing before 1942 where it had been held that the salary and
bonus were reasonable, but the annuity premium expended in 1941 under
the subject plan was excessive, and disallowed.9
89. This is not always the case. Cf. Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 28 (6th Cir. 1948)
wherein a large deduction was claimed for salaries paid to a valuable employee whose duties
were of a routine office nature.
90. STANLEY & KILCIJLLEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAx 65 (3d ed. 1955). Compare the
statement in Reg. § 1.401-1 (b) (3) that "if the Plan is so designed as to amount to a subter-
fuge for the distribution of profits to shareholders, it will not qualify as a plan for the exclusive
benefit of employees even though other employees who were not shareholders are also included
under the plan."
Other factors to consider are: (1) presumption of reasonableness from the board, of
approval-Toledo Grain & Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 171 (6th Cit. 1932); (2)
increase in cost of living-Roth Office Equip. Co. v. Gallagher, 172 F.2d 452 (6th Cir.
1949); (3) increase in sales and profits--Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States,
132 F. Supp. 711 (Ct. Cl. 1955); and (4) uniqueness of talent-Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. United States, supra.
91. E.g., H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cit. 1951); Surface Combustion Corp.,
9 T.C. 631 (1947); Gisholt Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 669 (1945).
92. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 63, at 188-95.
93. Draper & Co., 5 T.C. 822 (1945).
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Litigated cases on the subject under the Code subsequent to the 1942
amendments appear to be rare. The author has been able to find but one,
namely, Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner,94 a per curiam
opinion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the court found
that the compensation itself was unreasonable without regard to the
pension contribution. However, the court went on to say, quite logically,
that the pension contribution on behalf of the officer under attack was
likewise not deductible. 5 The mere absence or rarity of cases should
not be read as a barometer indicating the absence of a storm, for as was
stated by one writer:
The litigated cases [on unreasonable compensation generally] nu-
merous as they are, undoubtedly represent only a tiny fraction of the dis-
putes [involving unreasonable compensation] since the factual nature
of the question and the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the
Commissioner both make for settlements to avoid the cost and the un-
certainty of law suits.96
In part, a pension reflects an award for prior services rendered.
Statutorily, both sections 4 04 (a) (1) (A) and 404(a) (1) (C) reflect
congressional approval of a deduction taken for payments with respect
to past services. Case-wise, the leading decision of Lucas v. Ox Fibre
Brush Co., 7 states that "the statute does not require that services should
be actually rendered during the taxable year, but that payments therefor
shall be proper expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year."
Section 23(p), as amended in 1942, limited, and its successor, section
404, limits the extent to which the deduction can be taken for contribu-
tions with respect to past services. Probably in recognition of the Ox
Fibre case, Regulation section 1.404(a) -(1) (b) states:
What constitutes a reasonable allowance depends upon the facts in the
particular case. Among the elements to be considered in determining
this are the personal services actually rendered in prior years as well
as the current year and all compensation and contributions paid to or
for such employee in prior years as well as in the current year. Thus, a
contribution which is in the nature of additional compensation for ser-
vices performed in prior years may be deductible, even if the total of
such contributions and other compensation for the current year would
be in excess of reasonable compensation for services performed in the
current year, provided that such total plus all compensation and contri-
butions paid to or for such employee in prior years represents a reason-
94. 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950).
95. Deductions were not allowed for the balance of the contributions for 1942 because
(1) failure of the taxpayer to sustain his burden of showing that the contributions related to
contributions deductible under INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(p), 53 Stat. 37 (now INT.
REV. CODE OF 1954, § 404), as it existed prior to the 1942 amendment; and (2) for 1943,
for failure to sustain the burden of proving that the balance was unreasonable for the others.
96. BITxFER, FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 160 (Prelim. ed. 1953).
97. 281 U.S. 115 (1930).
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able allowance for all services rendered by the employee by the end of
the current year.98
The Ox Fibre case is judicial, and Regulation section 1.404(a)-
(1) (b) is administrative authority for the proposition that one does not
necessarily conclude or presume that the combined immediate compen-
sation for a year and pension cost and/or profit-sharing share for the
same year add up to a sum that is unreasonable compensation for such
year. Both are authority for the proposition that pension payments made
in a year for services not rendered in that year must be given reduced
weight before concluding that the payment when added to immediate
income is unreasonable. The Regulation does not stipulate the criteria
to be employed in determining the method of attributing the payment
to prior service. Actuarial techniques could be employed, and the arith-
metic technique of averaging the total payments over the full period
of employment to determine the cost per year also suggests itself. In
the latter case, showing reasonableness over all years might require the
production of further evidence for prior years. 9 This issue may arise
if the pension plan terminates shortly after it has been amended to in-
crease benefits. If one of the twenty-five highest paid participants is
within a few years of retirement age when the plan terminates, the cost
applicable to him will show up on the termination schedule as being
very high, and while Treasury PS 50 provisions will probably have been
incorporated in the plan, the issue of unreasonable compensation may
nevertheless arise. Some method of determining what part of the pay-
ment applies to prior service must then be determined, the arithmetic
averaging technique being the most simple. If a cost per year is developed,
and the "related back annual cost" is added to the annual compensation
for a year, a unique method of establishing reasonableness is suggested.
In rebuttal to a Service challenge to the reasonableness of compensation,
the courts have given much weight to earlier Service approval of deduc-
tion of a like or smaller amount of compensation.' 0
The figures in the following table bear no relationship to any actual
situation; the arithmetic device of dividing the aggregate pension cost by
sixteen years of employment is arbitrary, and the table is presented purely
to facilitate the explanation of a theory. It is assumed that $45,000 will
be allowed as reasonable; if so, the "related back" rule indicates that the
98. Reg. § 1A04(a)-l(b) (1956), as amended, T.D. 6676, 1963 INT. RaV. BULL. No.
41, at 6.
99. Prior to publication of Rev. Proc. 56-12, 1956-1 CuM. BULL. 1029, the rules for termi-
nation were set forth in Rev. Rul. 32, 1953-1 CUM. BuLL. 265 which provided, as did its
predecessor P.S. No. 60 that information on the twenty-five highest schedule at termination
should cover all years of the plan's operation.
100. Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1949); CO. Struse &
Sons, 15 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 766 (1946).
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annual compensation plus "related back cost" for the years before 1950 is
less than the allowable as reasonable immediate compensation for 1950 and
1951. The issue then relates to the pension cost for 1950 and 1951,
i.e., whether compensation of $48,590 is unreasonable, and the possible
counter charge of the Service that if related back to years before 1943,
particularly when related to the depression years, the amount is not really
reasonable for those years. The answer to that position is that the social
aspects of section 401 must be considered. Many believe that it is socially
desirable to provide a worker with a pension that approximates a relation-
ship to his final wage. Indeed, the integration rules'' in the Treasury's
Regulations permit the benefit to be based on the highest consecutive
five year average, and the published position on "final pay" plans indi-
cates that discrimination is minimized when the benefit is based on a final
five year average."' If the benefit is socially desirable, if it is not dis-
criminatory, if the cost can be pro-rated back to prior years under Treasury
rules, and when so pro-rated produces an amount which when added
to immediate compensation is less than an amount allowed as a deduction,
it is submitted that the deduction for the addition in cases for 1950 and
1951 in the above table ought to be allowed, for the amount under
these circumstances is reasonable.
Column 9: Determination of Amount Applicable to Participant.-
In a program where a level premium funding method is employed to deter-
mine costs, it is, relatively simple to insert in column 9 the amount contrib-
101. Reg. R 1.401-3(e) (i) (1963).
102. Rev. Rul. 157, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 67, 92.
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uted to the pension plan with respect to an employee in a particular year.
It is likewise simple, in the case of the profit-sharing plan, to indicate
the share deposited to the plan with respect to an employee in that year.
However, certain actuarial funding methods do not lend themselves to
individual cost computations and the Commissioner has generally accepted
a statement in a footnote, at the bottom of the form, that individual cost
methods should not be required due to the aggregate cost basis of deter-
mining contributions. It is, however, possible to apply the methods,
factors, and assumptions on a level premium basis. By this method, one
is able to determine the amount which would be contributed to the plan
if funding were determined differently. The amount which may be said
to be contributed with respect to such an employee is found by multi-
plying the contribution for the year by the ratio that one person's level
cost so computed bears to the sum of such level costs. The Internal
Revenue Bulletin on section 23(p) (1) (a) and (b) provided in part
III(1) that
where the costs in a self-insured plan are determined by an aggregate
method and cannot be satisfactorily allocated to an individual employee,
entries under [certain items] indicating the method used and the accrual
rates for the respective items may be acceptable if more detailed in-
formation is not specifically requested in the individual case. Specially
computed costs with respect to individual employees may also be re-
quired in some case (as, for example, where a participant owns a sig-
nificant proportion of stock),*103
The Service has not been prone to make requests for individual cost
allocations under such plans, but certain District Directors have shown
a disposition to request individual cost allocations where the aggregate
cost basis is used as a means of determining unreasonable compensation
and discrimination. Some determination of the individual cost is required
if a filing with the SEC must be made."'4
Column 9: Determining Discrimination.--When the long form
termination schedule is filed, the Service may very well attempt to de-
termine (the Volckening0 5 case notwithstanding) that during the lifetime
of the program such a disproportionate share of the contributions going
into the pension plan have gone for the benefit of the shareholders that
the program discriminated in its operation. Hence, it is questionable
whether the VoIckening case knocked out the 30 per cent rule. The
court held that it would not apply the test as an absolute in determining
whether discrimination existed or whether the plan was for the exclusive
benefit of the employees. It did not state that it would never look to
the proportionate allocation to determine discrimination. In fact, in
103. 1 CCH PENSION PLAN GUIDE 5 14501, at 5 14519.
104. SEC Reg. X-14A-11, schedule 14A, item 10, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-11 (1956).
105. Volckening, Inc., 13 T.C. 723 (1949).
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the per curiam opinion of the Sixth Circuit in the Charles E. Smith &
Sons Co.'0° case, it was held, after the date of the Volckening case, that
the trust in question had never been approved by the Commissioner. The
court stated that
it plainly was not established for the exclusive benefit of the employees.
Sec. 165, I.R.C. of the contributions made for the year ending July
31, 1942 - almost one half was allocated for the benefit of Hall C.
Smith. For the year ending July 31, 1943 - almost one third was
allocated for the benefit of Hall C. Smith. While Smith, as president
of the corporation, was its employee, he was also sole stockholder and
employer. As one of three trustees administering the trust, the two
other trustees being employees, he was in sole control not only of the
corporation, but of the trust, a substantial amount of which was laid
out for his benefit. Since the trust did not qualify as exempt, the
deductions were not allowable. 10 7
Inasmuch as the court had already held that compensation of Hall
C. Smith, inclusive of the cost of his pension, was not reasonable, and
therefore not allowable, the foregoing excerpt might be regarded as
obiter dictum. However, the statement does present disturbing qualms
as to the shield of the Volckening decision to a challenge of discrimina-
tion based on contribution allocation.
Did the Sixth Circuit tacitly overrule the Smith case when it rendered
its decision in H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh?.. The opinion of Judge
McAllister, one of the jurists who participated in rendering the per curiam
opinion in Smith, notes with approval, the Volckening and Betty C.
Stockvis cases09 which stand for the proposition that a plan is not dis-
criminatory where contributions for shareholders, supervisors, and execu-
tives are higher than for others because of their higher salaries, and where
the benefits bear a uniform relationship to compensation. However, the
Smith case was not discussed.
In the author's opinion, the comparison of costs per person is not a
proper test of discrimination for the reason that the plan must be examined
to determine whether it is designed to accomplish the social scheme
approved by Congress, or primarily designed to benefit but a few. If
the "bait" to be held out to those in control of the destiny of the corpora-
tion to adopt the plan is the lure of deferment of a part of their com-
pensation for tax purposes to a later date when it will be taxed at lower
rates, then the true test involved is not whether the cost per employee
is reasonable, but whether the cost of the entire plan is reasonable; not
whether the cost of one employee's benefit is disproportionate, but
whether many benefit as well. This attitude from a Canadian case is
106. Charles E. Smith & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1950).
107. Id. at 1014.
108. 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951).
109. 10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 74 (1951).
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exemplified by section 11 (1) (f) of the 1948 Canadian Income Tax Act
which permits the employer to deduct $900 "in respect of services ren-
dered by each employee, officer or director of the taxpayer in the year." A
question arose as to whether this meant $900 per employee or $900
multiplied by the number of employees covered. In No. 281 v. Minister
of National Revenue,"' the Income Tax Appeal Board held that it was
$900 multiplied by the number of employees, stating that the alternate
interpretation of disallowing the excess per person over $900 would
"nullify the clear intention of the Legislation which is to provide for ade-
quate superannuation of employees upon their retirement." It is sub-
mitted, therefore, that an interpretation in the U.S. statute is likewise
inappropriate where the result is to discourage adoption of the program.
When the long form termination schedule is submitted in connection
with a profit-sharing plan, lack of entries in column 9 for years prior
to termination, or the entry of minimal amounts, may result in a question
as to whether the plan has been operated in compliance with the part
of the Regulations which provides that "a (profit-sharing) plan does
not qualify under section 401 (a) if the contributions to the plan are
made at such times or in such amounts that the plan in operation dis-
criminates in favor of officers.... ." Just what test the Internal Revenue
Service would use to determine whether there had been compliance with
this rule is not dear, for mere absence of a contribution will not be suf-
ficient to establish discrimination. In the Lincoln Electric case, the
court held that the single contribution was substantial enough to accom-
plish objectives conceived at the time the statute was enacted, and it is
likely that before holding that the absence of a contribution in any year
produced discrimination, it would look for the motive and reason
for failure to contribute. A short cash position, wage increases, labor
problems, or a myriad of other economic factors can be present to rebut
the imputation of discrimination created by the absence of a contribution.
However, it is not so easy to answer the situation that arises when
the plan is non-discriminatory at its establishment, but then develops a
census of employees which comprise a discriminatory group. In the Ryan
School case the census was broad at the inception of the program and
then narrowed to only a few persons. If, in lieu of discontinuing con-
tributions, the employer had continued to contribute, and the plan had
then terminated, would the Commissioner have claimed that the timing
had resulted in discrimination? Perhaps it should be expected that the
attitude toward discontinuance should be more liberal than indicated
in the rulings.
The Ryan School case also suggests the questions which may arise
when the reviewing agent examines the entry under column 9 of the
110. 9 CCH DOMIION TAX CAs. 494 (Income Tax App. Bd. 1955).
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
long form termination schedule in order to evaluate the effect of a reallo-
cation of forfeitures. Revenue Ruling 61-157, part 5 (d) stipulates that
the forfeitures under a profit-sharing plan need not be applied in reduction
of contribution, but that whatever method is used must not result in
discrimination. A five year history of the allocation of forfeitures may
show that a substantial portion of these were allocated to persons in
whose favor discrimination may not exist in order to qualify. The totaling
of the information required by Item 3 (3), of Exhibit A would emphasize
this factor. The safest method of allocation, therefore, is to apportion the
forfeitures annually in the same manner as a contribution, not merely
because of the problems on termination, but because the Service can
always challenge the operation of the program.
Column 10: Employee Contributions.-It is not clear why the
taxpayer should submit data as to employee contributions made in the
five years before the plan's termination. However, the purpose becomes
dearer when compared with the information required to be submitted
under Item 4, of Exhibit A of Revenue Procedure 56-12. The comparison
may reveal that some who were eligible did not contribute because of
the amount required.
Summarizing this portion of the discussion, it may be stated that the
submission of the long form schedule upon termination of the plan
covering the most recent five year period is in many ways more revealing
than the submission of the twenty-five highest schedule on establishment
of the plan. Both are designed to reveal the nature of the group covered,
discrimination as to contributions or benefits, unreasonable compensation,
etc., but a better view of these factors in operation is obtained on exami-
nation of a sheet covering a five year, rather than a one year period. On
submitting the information, counsel should attempt to assay the possi-
bilities of a Service challenge, and review the case law which has been
more favorable to the taxpayer than the Commissioner's rules.
Item 3(g), Exhibit A - Revenue Procedure 56-12
As indicated at the beginning of the discussion of the long form ter-
mination schedule, the final column of the schedule is to indicate the share
of the assets of the program which will be distributed to those covered by
the plan at the time of its termination. Revenue Ruling 61-157 part
5 (c) (2) is the most recent in a series of rulings published by the Service
which indicates that plans are to contain clauses covering disposition of
assets upon termination. Just how to do this in advance is an adventure
in clairvoyance, for the draftsman must attempt to deal with a problem
usually far in advance of its occurrence in a manner which at that time
will be considered fair, non-discriminatory, correct, and satisfactory. At the
inception of the program, it is difficult to persuade the client to consider
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the problem since it is the least of his interests, and further because the
promoters of the program are usually the least anxious to suggest the prob-
lems of termination. There are few expectations for the person who sin-
cerely wants to explore, at the time of birth, the problems of death. Indeed,
no matter how sincere one may have been in dealing with the subject
at the inception of the program, it is the writer's experience that circum-
stances of termination often compel complete revamping of the clauses
for clarification. However, there are a few "ground rules."
The first step in revamping is to classify the plan. If it is a profit-
sharing plan, the provisions for termination will be easy to draw at the
plan's inception, for records of the individual equities will have been
maintained during the plan's life. When the plan terminates, an inven-
tory is taken of the trust fund and the value of the account of each in-
dividual is determined. The plan will normally provide that the forfeitures
which have arisen since the last valuation of the inventory of the securities
will be distributed among the accounts of the participants on an equitable
and non-discriminatory basis. Usually, this is done by multiplying the
forfeitures by the ratio of the amount in one person's account to the total
amount in the accounts, although per capita allocations are also accepta-
ble. If no contribution was made to the plan when last regularly due,
pursuant to Revenue Ruling 55-186, the forfeiture will usually be con-
strued by the Service as belonging to the participant who terminated em-
ployment and such individual will normally have to be included in the plan
to receive the value of that forfeiture at the termination of the program.
If the plan is a pension plan, however, much more complicated
problems arise. Dorrance Bronson points out in his celebrated article
that subclassification of a plan is a fundamental consideration in de-
termining the clauses to be included in the plan covering termination."'
For example, if the plan is of the individual policy pension trust type,
the identification of equities is easily traced to the policy or policies
acquired on behalf of each participant and any surplus funds arising by
reason of final dividends, prior excess contributions, terminal year for-
feitures, etc., are usually disposed of proportionately. Correspondingly,
annuities under a group annuity contract are also easily identified and
easily distributed. However, it is not so simple to dispose of assets of a fully
self-administered plan, a deposit administration contract plan, a program
involving individual ordinary life policies convertible to annuities at
retirement with funds accumulating in a trust fund or insurance company
deposit administration account, or a self-administered plan which at
retirement has in some cases bought annuities. It is in these areas that
counsel must recognize that money contributed has not been branded
with the name of any person as being deposited for his benefit and that
111. 7 TRANSACTONS Socina op AcruAms 225-57 (1955).
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the time-worn statement that "money has no earmark" is particularly
applicable. It is here that counsel must attempt to glean from his client
how he wants the money divided, for he must understand that it is not
necessary that all benefit upon termination, but rather that the distribution
be non-discriminatory. Revenue Ruling 61-167, part 5 (c) (2) provides
as follows:
For example, a distribution which benefits only the employees over the
age of 50 at the time of termination of the plan or only those who have
at least 10 years of service or only those who meet both age and service
requirements may be acceptable if there is no possibility of discrimina-
tion in favor of employees who are highly compensated, etc. Such a
situation may exist in a plan covering only wage and hourly rated em-
ployees. Upon termination, again provided that there is no possibility
of prohibitive discrimination, the funds may be used first to continue
benefits to retired employees, then for employees who have met the re-
quirements for retirement but have not actually retired, then for em-
ployees over age 50 and so on until the funds are exhausted.
Various formulas are customary in these plans. One is that each
person shall receive a disbursement proportionate to his actuarial value.
Another is to develop classes with priority interest in the assets, usually
giving the retired lives the highest priority. The classes are customarily
fixed by age, the employees being divided into quinquennial age groups,
starting with the age of the oldest non-retired employee. In other instances,
classification by service completed is important. It is in drawing these
clauses that mistakes most frequently appear that cause endless frustration
at the time the plan terminates. The list below is not exhaustive, but
may prove helpful in determining what to consider.
Failure to Provide for Final Termination Expenses.-When a plan
terminates for business necessity, there may be no corporate funds to pay
final counsel, actuarial, and trustee fees. If there are funds available,
and the employer wishes to pay fees directly, the clause may be eliminated
at the time of termination - a task easier to perform than amending
at the time of termination to provide for reduction of plan assets by the
amount needed to meet terminal expenses. Under the latter circum-
stances, an objection may be raised by those about to receive disburse-
ments of the diminution of their equitable interests and consents may
have to be obtained.
Failure to Include in the Census All Persons Having Contingent
Interests in the Program.-Failure to have a broad enough census may
arise for a variety of reasons, generally described as oversight. One cause
of such failure is due to the difference between the terms of the union
contract and the plan filed for qualification purposes.
The typical United Steelworkers type of contract, for example,
provides that an employee who retires within the term of the contract
would be the one who benefits exclusively. Provisions of this kind do
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not lend themselves easily to prefunding of the benefit within the scope
of PS 67. Therefore, a plan which could qualify for Treasury purposes
was adopted to implement the union contract, the plan providing that
there would be a funding of benefits on a different basis from that limited
by the contract with the union. In the provision of the 'Treasury" plan
dealing with termination, the typical clauses provided that the funds
within the trust would be applied first to provide benefits for those who
had retired, and second for those who were eligible to retire with the bal-
ance reverting to the employer. It is significant to note, however, that
within the scope of its power to rule upon the qualification of the pro-
gram, the Service held that such a clause in a union program dealing with
the distribution of money in a manner acceptable to the union upon the
termination of a plan was improper. While consistent with the union
contract, such a provision would violate the provisions of the law which
stipulate that except for the case of an erroneous actuarial computation,
none of the money may revert to the employer. The Service insisted that
the balance of the money remaining within the plan upon termination
must be applied to provide benefits for employees who were ineligible
to retire as a contingent liability exists with respect to this group.
This common error also arises if mention of the equities to be dis-
tributed to persons having vested benefits is excluded from the termination
provisions. Vesting may take many forms in a plan, but the most com-
mon in a self-insured plan or a program of the group annuity type is
to provide that at the normal retirement date, the individual is entitled
to receive the benefit which has accrued to him to the date of his termi-
nation of employment. In the self-administered plans negotiated by
the auto workers, such vesting benefits were added by amendment rather
than by original provision, and through oversight in many cases, no
mention was made of the rights at termination of persons potentially
eligible for vested deferred retirement benefits. The Service, within
the scope of its power to provide that no reversion occur except upon
satisfaction of all fixed and contingent liabilities, held that such termina-
tion clauses were improper. Usually, the problem has been cured in
such programs by stipulating an enumeration of classes of employees
by quinquennial age groups and then adding at the end a statement such
as the following: within each of the foregoing groups shall be included
former employees of the same age who, at the time of termination
of the plan, are potentially eligible for a vested deferred retirement benefit,
provided that they reply in writing within 90 days to a certified letter
mailed to them no later than the date of termination of the plan indicating
to the Board their whereabouts; but any such employee shall be entitled
to share in the trust fund only after the satisfaction of benefits for active
employees within the same class at the time of termination of the plan.
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Response to a certified letter mailed to an employee is vitally im-
portant, for frequently it is difficult to know the whereabouts of the
former employees. Failure to determine the census of the persons eligible
for the vested deferred retirement benefits frequently results in an
inability to prorate the fund inasmuch as such trust funds are normally
not sufficient to care for all retirants.
Still another way in which errors are committed is to fail to recognize
that there are persons other than the pensioners who receive benefits.
Many plans stipulate that participants are eligible to elect optional
methods of payment of pensions such that, upon the death of the retired
participant, benefits will be payable to a survivor for a lifetime (joint
and survivorship option) or for a period of time which when combined
with the period in which payments were made to the pensioner in his
lifetime does not exceed, for example, five or ten years (five or ten
year certain options). Beneficiaries of participants under these conditions
may in fact be receiving benefits, or if the participant himself has elected
the optional method, may be themselves entitled to optional methods
of payments at a later time. In such plans, it is necessary to provide
that beneficiaries and contingent annuitants receiving benefits stand in
the shoes of the retired participant. A corollary problem to that of
assuring inclusion of beneficiaries and contingent annuitants is that of
spelling out in the termination clause that:
(a) The benefit of one who has elected an option and is living
at the time of termination will be valued according to the standard
form of payment under the plan - life annuity, ten year certain,
etc. - but will be adjusted, after determining the size of the share,
to provide payment in the optional form selected;
(b) The benefit of the surviving contingent annuitant of a
deceased pensioner will be valued (normally) as a straight life
annuity, based on the age and sex of the surviving contingent
annuitant; and
(c) The benefit of a beneficiary receiving payments to the end
of a term certain is to be valued as the commuted value of the unpaid
installments.
Mistaken Inclusion.-The error of including persons not potentially
eligible for benefits occurs as a result of failure to correlate the termina-
tion provisions with the requirements for retirement benefits. It is a
serious error because it depletes the assets of the program to the detriment
of those who can potentially qualify for benefit and is difficult to remove
at termination.
Many plans provide that employees age 65 or over and having ten
years of service are eligible to retire on normal retirement pensions. The
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termination provisions on the other hand will normally provide that the
fund will be divided by first taking care of those who have retired and
then taking care of those age 65 and over. Suppose an employee is age
65 at the time the plan terminates, has five years of service and cannot,
because of a ceiling on the age up to which an individual may acquire
service credit, accumulate sufficient credit for a normal pension should
the plan continue. Under such conditions, it is recommended that the
plan include an additional provision to the effect that no persons shall be
included in any classification described above unless he could, assuming
his fulltime employment, accumulate sufficient credited service to be
eligible for a retirement benefit.
Failure to Recognize All Sources of Payments And Assets at Termi-
nation.-Nothing prevents the employer from providing in his plan
that at retirement he may acquire annuities to provide the benefits for
some employees and pay others directly from the trust fund. Such provi-
sions often occur in certain so-called "combination plans" where insurance
contracts are acquired that are convertible at the retirement age of the
individual to provide the annuity but where it is contemplated that con-
version will not occur in every case where (a) it is apparent that the
health of the employee is so poor that payment of monies to the insurer
might be impractical, or (b) where the cash position of the trust fund
is such that it is not desirable to sell securities at the time of retirement,
but rather to pay the pension payments from the trust fund while deferring
the acquisition of the annuity from the insurer. Under such conditions,
it becomes necessary that the annuity contract remain within the trust
so as to provide for the payment of the pension to the participant and
yet be subject to cancellation and reduction should the trust fund be
inadequate to provide full retirement benefits at any particular time for
those who have retired, but with respect to whom similar annuities have
not been bought. Another part of the same problem is the need to recog-
nize that at termination, final dividend payments are due the trust from an
insurer.
When any pension plan, other than a fully insured pension plan,
is terminated, there is the distinct possibility that the assets at the time
of termination will fall short of the amount needed to sustain the benefits
of the retired lives, or even if enough to sustain those benefits, will not
be sufficient to provide any disbursements to anyone else. In the former
situation, common law questions arise that will not be considered here.
Aside from these, however, the Treasury Department may raise the
question as to whether the program met the minimum funding require-
ments of Treasury PS 57, or, in a union negotiated case, whether the
certificate rendered pursuant to Treasury PS 64 was properly earned.
"Actuarial soundness" and "full reserve concept" of funding are not
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
synonymous terms and it may very well be that even if the employer
desires to fund the full reserve, the limitations imposed by section 404
(a) (1) of the Code will not permit large enough deposits to be made
on a deductible basis annually to accomplish this objective. In fact,
funding at the minimum basis permitted by Treasury PS 57 will not
usually result in accumulation of enough funds to provide adequate
reserves. The actuarial assumption of a normal amount of labor
turnover and withdrawal usually does not assume retirement by
each person eligible for normal retirement when first eligible, much less
early retirement at the earliest date for each person eligible. Yet, when
the plan terminates, the retirement rolls are likely to swell suddenly as
eligible employees climb aboard the bandwagon. This is particularly
true if the plan terminates as the result of the dosing of a plant, or
shutting down of operations. Assurances of guarantee from an insurer
who has issued annuities under a deposit administration contract are, at
this point, likely to prove to have a meaning not accepted as being within
the colloquial definition of guarantee, for as more people demand
annuities, the insurer will reduce the annuities of those drawing benefits
to add funds to be distributed among all who have retired. (The
guarantee will be found, under these conditions, to be a guarantee of
preservation of principal and annuity rates.)
The complaints of those failing to receive any disbursements whatever
are likely to be more numerous in the case of the union negotiated, cents-
per-hour type plan, for here the employees often think of the deposits
made to the plan with respect to hours which they have worked as having
been made on their behalf. The failure to receive any share of the fund
under these conditions is an understandable disappointment which can
promote time consuming inquiries, the likelihood of which the employer
may wish to balance against the satisfaction of a limitation of his liability
under the plan.
To effect a disbursement of the trust funds, it is normally necessary
that the entire trust fund be reduced to cash so as to provide funds to
purchase annuities, etc. In certain cases, it becomes desirable to deliver
the equities in the fund to the participants in specie upon its termination.
For example, an individual may no longer be insurable and subject to
applicable requirements of state law. In such a case it may be advisable
to deliver to him the insurance contracts issued on his life which were
taken out at an earlier time. In other instances, stock of the employer
may be the desired method of distribution. In others, it may be desirable
to deliver annuity contracts to the individuals; and in still others it is
desirable to disburse in a lump sum. The Service has normally accepted
clauses included in the plans which provide that the method of disburse-
ment may be any one or any combination of methods so long as the
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value of whatever is distributed does not exceed the actuarial value of
the benefit of the participant in the fund at the time of its termination.
Terminal Tax Problems
The taxable nature of the distribution will unquestionably have an
influence upon the method of distribution. Sections 402(a) (2) and
403 (a) (2) of the Code provide that where the total distribution appli-
cable to a participant is made to him within one taxable year on account
of termination of employment, the tax on the distribution will be com-
puted as though distribution were a long term capital gain. The statute
precludes similar treatment where the distribution is made upon termi-
nation of the plan, except that section 402 (e) provides that a distribution
made in the calendar year 1954 as a result of termination of the plan
incident to the complete liquidation of the corporation occurring before
the date of enactment of section 402 (e) would be treated as a separation
from service. In Edward Joseph Glinske Jr.,." the Tax Court had held
that the distribution to a participant was not a capital gain where the
participant continued in the employ of a new owner who, three weeks
after acquisition, terminated the plan. The maintenance of the plan
by the purchaser for this short period was damaging. In the
Mary Miller case," 3 the plan and employment terminated simultaneously
in a situation where one department store bought the assets of an-
other, and the seller was dissolved. Clerks continued to work at the
same station for the new organization, performing the same work
for the purchaser as they had for the seller. The Service claimed that
in substance there had been no termination of employment, but the Tax
Court and the Sixth Circuit held otherwise. While the Commissioner
could have refused acquiescence in the theory of Mary Miller and held
on the basis of the dear stipulation of time in section 402(e) that Con-
gress did not intend that long term capital gain treatment be accorded
under facts similar to those in Mary Miller except where section 402 (e)
would apply, he did not do so. Instead, in 1958, a series" 4 of rulings was
published which indicate that under circumstances where Mary Miller
could logically be thought to apply, i.e., simultaneous terminations of
employment and a plan, the long term capital gain treatment would
be applicable.
In Regulation 1.402(a)-(1) (a) (2), the rule is stated that the dis-
112. 17 T.C. 562 (1951). Would the result have been different if the distribution had been
deferred until termination of employment after the termination of the plan? The cases do
not answer the question.
113. 22 T.C. 293 (1954), nonacq., 1955-1 CUm. BuLL. 8, aff'd, 226 F.2d 618 (6th Cir.
1955).
114. Rev. Ruls. 94-99, 1958-1 CUM BULL. 194-202.
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tribution of an annuity contract will not result in tax at the time of
distribution. Of all rules pertaining to termination of a plan, this is
the most important in terms of sheltering lower paid persons from an
undesirable tax consequence. The Regulation further provides, however,
that a distribution of an insurance contract will result in immediate tax
unless, within 60 days after distribution, the contract is irrevocably con-
verted to an annuity." 5 This must be kept in mind by those desiring
to continue insurance.
Suppose a participant wishes a distribution partly in cash and partly
in the form of a contract. In a private ruling letter known as the Beairsto
letter,"' it was held that the lump sum would be taxed as a capital gain
and the tax on the annuity deferred. Coupling this ruling with the Mary
Miller rulings suggests interesting pre-termination planning.
Special rules apply when stock of an employer is distributed. In
a discussion of this subject, the following has been stated:
The benefit referred to is a deferment of tax on any unrealized appre-
ciation in the value of the securities. Under a contributory plan, the
appreciation is not taxed at the time of distribution to the extent at-
tributable to contributions by the participant, regardless of whether the
distribution occurs during employment, upon termination of employ-
ment or after termination of employment, and whether at one time or
in installments."17
In the case of a non-contributory plan, the unrealized appreciation is
excluded from currently taxed income only if the distribution represents
the balance or part of the balance of the total distributions payable,
and is made within one taxable year of the distributee - that is, a
distribution which would qualify for long-term capital gains treatment
under the usual rule.118
The tax rule relative to unrealized appreciation of employer securities
does not mean, of course, that the participant escapes tax on the dis-
tribution. At most, it is the tax on unrealized appreciation which is
deferred. To the exent that the securities were purchased by the trust
from sources other than employee contributions, the participant is
subject to tax, possible at capital gains rate, computed upon the cost
of the securities. This cost becomes his cost basis for determining
gain or loss if and when the participant makes a sale or other taxable
disposition of the securities." 9 However, if the participant holds the
115. P-H PENsION AND PROFIT-SHARING SERVICE 5 5305.
116. CODE §S 4 02(a) (3) (A), (B).
117. CODE § 402(a)(1).
118. CODE § 402(a) (2).
119. Reg. § 1.402 (a)-1(b) (1) (ii) (1963). As to the rules for determining the cost of secu-
rities, either on an earmarked or an average basis, see Reg. § 1.402 (a) -1(b) (ii), Rev. Rul.
354, 1955-1 CUM. BULL. 396; Rev. Rul. 514, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 261. A fine point
of distinction is made in Reg. § 1.402(b) (1) (ii) that where there is a lump sum (one year)
distribution, any realization of unrealized appreciation is considered long-term gala regardless
of the holding period of the employee. However, any excess of gain over the net unrealized




securities and does not sell them, he escapes income tax entirely on the
unrealized appreciation.'2 0
Again, the necessity of evaluating whether the distribution will be taxed
as a long term capital gain must be made. The tax consideration may
have to give way to a consideration of retaining corporate control.
The distributee is not alone in tax problems upon termination of a
plan. The employer who has contributed in excess of allowable limits
may also have his problems. For example, suppose that the taxpayer
elects to make a final terminal contribution in excess of the limit allow-
able for deduction in a taxable year. Will he be able to carry the amount
forward and deduct the excess in years when the trust no longer exists?
Section 404 (a) (1) (D) provides for a carry forward of the undeductible
excess under a pension plan, and the third sentence of section 404 (a) (3)
(A) provides for a carry forward under a profit-sharing plan.
Regulation 1.404 (a) -(9) (a) provided that for an excess contribu-
tion to be deductible in a taxable year later than the one in which made,
the trust must be exempt in the taxable year in which the deduction is
claimed. Obviously, a non-existent trust cannot be exempt. In Royer's
Inc. v. United States, 2' the court noted that the Regulations were predi-
cated on statutory language found in the United States Code Annotated.
Counsel for the taxpayer, however, pointed out that the text upon which
the Commissioner relied did not appear in the statute as printed in the
Statutes at Large. The court held that the statutes of the United States
are as set forth in the Statutes at Large and accordingly held the Regulation
invalid. In T.I.R. No. 181, the Commissioner stated that he would fol-
low the case.
Regulations 1.40 4 (a) -3 (a) and 1.404 (a) -8 (a) (2) also implied that
in order for the excess contribution to be deductible, the trust must be in ex-
istence and qualify in the year when the deduction is daimed. T.I.R. No.
181 has also amended that implication and accordingly the carry forward
pursuant to Regulation 1.404 (a) -7 would apply. Mergers and consolida-
tions have presented unlimited problems in the field of qualified plans,"m
but it was early held in PS 62 that in a statutory merger a corporate suc-
cessor could carry forward and deduct the prior undeducted excess of a
predecessor company. The rule has achieved statutory confirmation in
section 381 (c) (20) of the Code. 2'
120. Rice, Income Tax Consequences to Employee-Beneficiaries of Pension and Profit Sharing
Plans, in TAXATIoN OF DEFEREm EMPLOYEE & ,EXCUTIVE COMPENSATION 368-69 (Sellin
ed. 1960). Notes 117, 118, and 119 have been added by the author.
121. 265 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1959).
122. Cf. Lurie, Pensions after Mergers and Spin-Offs, 10 TAX L. REv. 531 (1955); Robbins,
Effect of Corporate Reorganizations on Pension and Profit Sharing Plans, N.Y.U. 17th INsT.
ON FED. TAX 951 (1958).
123. See also CODE § 381(c) (11).
1964]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Summary of Form Procedure Under Revenue Procedure 56-12
Item 3, Exhibit A.-There is no more burdensome chore upon termi-
nation of a plan than preparation of the long form termination schedule.
The data disclosed should cause counsel to review it to determine chal-
lenges of unreasonable compensation and discrimination. In anticipa-
tion of termination and the filing of data showing distributive shares up-
on termination, care must be taken at the inception of a plan to draft a
workable termination clause, having in mind possible tax consequences.
When termination does occur, the structure for termination must be re-
examined; where necessary, amendments should be made to correct an
oversight, eliminate discrimination, produce greater equity, conform to
factors not foreseeable when the plan was first drawn, and to work to the
greatest tax advantage of the distributees and the employer. Not all of
these problems will be suggested by the long form termination schedule,
but it will reflect whatever solution will be given to the problem.
Item 4, Exhibit A.-This item requires that there be furnished
a schedule showing separately for the year in which the plan is termi-
nated or curtailed and for each of the preceding years of the plan's
operation (not in excess of 5, unless requested):
(a) The number of participants at the beginning of the period.
(b) The number added.
(c) The number who dropped out.
(d) The number remaining at the end of the period.
This information is very similar to the data required by Regulation 1.404
(a) -2 (a) (5 ). Pursuant to Regulation 1.404 (a) -2 (b), the same infor-
mation must be submitted annually for each year the program is claimed
to qualify under section 401 (a). Hence, the preparation of the data is not
difficult.
The final paragraph of Regulation 1.404 (a) -2 (a) (5) provides that in
each year in which the plan is claimed to qualify under section 401 (a) (3)
(A), data and computations necessary to establish qualification must be
submitted.'24 Section 401 (a) (3) (A) is a provision of the statute sel-
dom used to establish qualification. Often cited as the "arbitrary rule,"
it provides that if certain percentages of employees are covered, the plan
qualifies without having to prove no discrimination. Presumably, a pro-
gram which has established its qualified status on that basis each year
would be filing the data in vain and a waiver might properly be requested
under Regulation 1.4 04 (a)-2 (e).
Since proof of qualification under the "arbitrary rule" is not likely to
be enhanced or hampered by proof of the consolidated census schedule, it
follows that the information submitted is to be examined for another rea-
124. Reg. § 1.4 01-3(a) (1963) indicates the manner of proof.
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son. It is suggested that the agent will correlate the data in Item 3 with
the data in Item 4 in order to determine that inclusions and values apply-
ing to those included present a discriminatory pattern when compared
with those excluded. However, to the author's knowledge this argument
has not been raised.
Item 5, Exhibit A.-This item requires "a statement as to whether
any of the funds under the plan will revert to or become available to the
employer; if so, details are to be furnished."
Section 401 (a) (2) of the statute requires that the trust, to qualify,
must provide that prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities, no part of its
corpus or income will be used for purposes other than the exclusive bene-
fit of employees or their beneficiaries. Hence, a reversion to the employer
is possible. Regulation 1.401-2 discusses the meaning of this section, but
perhaps it is not amiss to quote from article 165-1 (e) of the Regulations
under the 1939 Code which differs somewhat from the current regula-
tions, but which is of interest since it was adopted so close to the date of
adoption of the provision.
Meaning of "liabilities".-The intent and purpose in section 165 (a) (2)
of the phrase "prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect to
employees and their beneficiaries under the trust" is to permit the em-
ployer to reserve the right to recover at the termination of the trust,
and only at such termination, such balance in the trust as is due to
erroneous actuarial computations during the previous life of the trust.
A balance due to an "erroneous actuarial computation" is the surplus
arising because actual requirements differ from the expected require-
ments based upon previous actuarial valuations of liabilities or deter-
mination of costs of providing pension benefits under the plan in ac-
cordance with reasonable assumptions as to mortality, interest, etc., and
correct procedures relating to the method of funding, all as made by a
careful peson skilled in calculating the amounts necessary to satisfy
pecuniary obligations of such a nature. For example, a trust has accumu-
lated assets of $1,000,000 at the time of liquidation, determined by
acceptable actuarial procedures using reasonable assumptions as to in-
terest, mortality, etc., as being necessary to provide the benefits in
accordance with the provisions of the plan. Upon such liquidation it is
found that $950,000 will satisfy all of the liabilities under the plan. The
surplus of $50,000 arises, therefore, because of the difference between
the amounts actuarially determined and the amounts actually required to
satisfy the liabilities. This $50,000, therefore, is the amount which
may be returned to the employer as the result of an erroneous actuarial
computation. If, however, the surplus of $50,000 had been accumulated
as a result of a change in the benefit provisions or in the eligibility
requirements of the plan, the $50,000 could not revert to the employer
because such surplus would not be the result of an erroneous actuarial
calculation. The term "liabilities" as used in section 165 (a) (2) in-
dudes both fixed and contingent obligations to employees. For ex-
ample, if 1,000 employees are covered by a trust forming part of a
pension plan, 300 of whom have satisfied all the requirements for a
monthly pension, while the remaining 700 employees have not yet com-
pleted the required period of service, contingent obligations to such
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700 employees have nevertheless arisen which constitute "liabilities"
within the meaning of that term. It must be impossible for the em-
ployer (or other nonemployee) to recover any amounts other than such
amounts as remain in the trust because of "erroneous actuarial compu-
tations" after the satisfaction of all fixed and contingent obligations,
and the trust instrument must contain a definite affirmative provision
to that effect, whether the obligations to employees have their source
in the trust instrument itself, in the plan of which the trust forms a
part, or in some collateral instrument or arrangement forming a part of
such plan, and whether such obligations are, technically speaking,
liabilities of the employer, of the trust, or of some other person form-
ing a part of the plan or connected with it.'2 5
The term "erroneous actuarial computation" is a handy term, but a
misnomer. In essence, it means that experience under the plan indicates
that the plan has not performed according to its assumptions, and that ac-
cordingly there is a surplus of money. It can come about through market
appreciation of a portfolio valued at cost, mortality in excess of that antic-
ipated, or a host of any other reasons. Unanswered is the question of
whether those discharged prior to closing down a plant constitute a group
with respect to which there are contingent liabilities. It is not possible
for any surplus to remain under a profit-sharing plan."2 6
Usually, there are no returns under the individual policy pension trust.
In Revenue Ruling 61-157, part 3 (f) (3) and (4), the Service held that
dividends on contracts earned after discontinuance of the plan could be
applied to buy additional retirement annuities, or be returned directly to
the employer on a theory analagous to that of a return of an erroneous
actuarial computation.
Item 6, Exhibit A.-Here there is required "a statement with full
particulars as to any funds under the plan which at any time were con-
tributed in the form of or invested in obligations or property of the em-
ployer or related companies."
The investment by a trust in stock or property for an employer pre-
sents a special field in itself, and no attempt is made to cover it in this
article. It has been studied from its social implications, 2 ' and has been
of interest to the tax lawyer for many reasons, not the least of which is
that a deduction may be taken from corporate income with one hand, and
the money returned to the corporate treasury with the other. It also has
interesting estate planning implications, for a trust may enter into an
agreement with a shareholder to purchase his shares at death, thereby ful-
filling the requirements of a "buy and sell" arrangement where the pro-
visions for redemption might otherwise be barred by state law. 2' It
125. Regulations 111, (INT. REv. CODE OF 1939) § 29.165-2(b), as amended, T.D. 5422,
1944 CuM. BULL. 318.
126. See generally Rev. Rul. 157, pt. 3, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 67, 68.
127. See HARBRECHT, PENsIoN FUNDs AND ECONOMIC POWER (1959).
128. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE S 1701.35.
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might also provide a vehicle for taking a deduction by contributing au-
thorized but unissued shares where there is no cash available for making
a contribution. In a management fight, it would be possible for manage-
ment to contribute shares to the trust in order to vote them. Such vari-
ations of employment and exploitation are almost unlimited. Nothing
in the statute prohibits an employer from causing a trust qualifying
under section 401 (a) from investing in his shares. 2 ' In fact, section
402 (a) (2) seems to presume that it has been done in discussing the
taxable nature of the distribution of such funds. Regulation 1.401-1 (b)
(5) states that there must be a full disclosure of the reasons for the in-
vestment. In Treasury PS 49, the Service first stipulated the information
which must be filed to effect a disclosure, and currently, substantially
the same information is required to be filed on Form 990-P which is the
annual information return which the trustee is required to file under
section 6033 of the Internal Revenue Code. If the employer wishes
to obtain a predetermination of the propriety of having the trust make
the investment, the request would be made for a ruling under Revenue
Procedure 56-12, and disclosure made in accordance with the require-
ments of Exhibit A.
It is not only stock of the employer mi which the trust may invest, but
other property as well. In Revenue Ruling 46, the Service noted that
nothing prevented the trust from investing in property of the employer
who created the trust, but that where deductions would be attempted in
connection with transactions involving such property, the size of the de-
duction would be limited to the amount applicable under section 23(p)
(now section 404) if it were found that the transaction was not bona fide.
It would appear that the Service had in mind certain lease transactions
which would involve collection of rent by the trust. But the danger of
running afoul of the prohibited transaction rules of section 503 (c) must
be kept in mind.
Despite the stringent nature of the restrictions imposed upon investing
in stock or property of the employer, the advantages are so great that em-
ployers have not been deterred from making such an investment. Hence,
the possibility exists that at termination, it will be revealed that some facet
of the transaction has resulted in discrimination, or that the program has
not operated for the exclusive benefit of the employees. Few cases have
arisen in which the Service has challenged the qualification of the trust
129. There are two ways that an employer may cause the portfolio to hold his securities.
The most common is to direct the trustee to so invest the fund. The second is to make the
contribution in securities, in which event the fair market value exceeds the cost basis of
the securities contributed. See, e.g., International Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d
310 (2d Cir. 1943). Presumably, the rule would apply whether the stock was that of the cor-
poration or that of another company. In United States v. General Shoe Corp., 282 F.2d 9
(6th Cir. 1960), the employer contributed depreciated property. The court held that the
gain must be figured on the excess of fair market value over depreciated basis.
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because of the nature in which the investments were made. Perhaps the
most notable is that of H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh.3 ' There, the district
court noted that the taxpayer had set up two plans, one called the "Execu-
tive Trust," and the other the "Employees' Trust." The court held that
where the employer sets up two plans, both must be jointly considered
to determine discrimination.' 3 ' The original res of each trust was in-
vested in common stock of the employer. However, twice as much had
initially been contributed to the Executive Trust as to the Employees'
Trust and no later contributions had been made to the Employees' Trust.
Subsequent contributions made to the Executive Trust were applied to
exercise an option to purchase the Employer's plant. A profit of $14,000
was later realized from that transaction. Three years after the trusts had
started, the Executive Trust, covering four employees, had a gain of
$31,838.88. The Employees' Trust, covering twenty-three employees,
had gained less than $750. The assets of the former were $55,400 and
of the latter, $12,800. Based on this background, the Commissioner re-
voked his favorable determination letter. He was sustained in the dis-
trict court, but the Sixth Circuit reversed.'32 The latter court held that
it was proper for the trustee to invest in the employer's securities, and that
mere investment in such securities would not of itself result in an infer-
ence that the program was being operated for only a few executives.
Moreover, the court held that the government had failed to meet its bur-
den of proving that the option had been acquired for less than market
value, or that the company had diverted profits. In substance, the court
held that discrimination cannot be established from results; the govern-
ment must prove that the facts produced discrimination. The court re-
lied heavily on the government's original approval of the program. The
case is significant because of its lengthy and intelligent discourse on the
subject of investments.
TERMINATING MULTI-EMPLOYER AND UNION NEGOTIATED
AREA AND INDUSTRY-WIDE PLANS
Multi-Employer Plans
Aside from classifying plans as profit-sharing or pension, and then
sub-classifying pension plans by formula (unit credit, fixed benefit, or
money purchase) and by funding medium (insured or self-administered),
a further evaluation of a plan must be made to determine whether it is
a program to which more than one employer has contributed. Section
401 (a) does not provide that a plan may be maintained jointly by more
than one employer, although section 404 (a) (3) (B) speaks of a profit-
130. 88 F. Supp. 64 (E.D. Mich. 1949), revd, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951).
131. See also P.S. No. 27.
132. H.S.D. Co. v. Kavanagh, 191 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1951).
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sharing plan maintained by employers affiliated under section 1504. How-
ever, the Regulations 33 provide that joint maintenance is possible if all
the requirements are otherwise satisfied. It is not necessary that the re-
lationship of parent and subsidiary exist.' What is necessary is that the
plan qualify" 5 with respect to each employer, and further that there be a
division in cost, preferably on a proportionate compensation basis."'
Benefits may be computed on the basis of consolidated earnings, the Ser-
vice having gone so far as to hold that in an "integrated" plan,' the
benefit may be figured on the basis of earnings in excess of $4,800.00.'
Special problems arise when terminating such a plan with respect to
one employer, but not with respect to all. There appear, despite the
plethora of Treasury Department rules on virtually every subject, to be no
published rules with respect to this topic. As in the case of the single em-
ployer program, termination is easy where the equities of participants can
be identified, as in the case of a profit-sharing plan or individual policy
or group annuity pension plan, but the problems arise when the plan is
a wholly or partially self-administered plan. In the latter case, benefits
are likely to have been funded on the basis of a common consolidation of
133. Cf. Reg. 9 1.401-1 (d) (1964). There are precedent regulations under prior Internal
Revenue Codes.
134. INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 defined corporations connected through stock ownership.
In P.S. No. 14, the Service held that affiliation within the scope of that statutory provision
was not required.
135. See P.S. No. 14. It has been ruled that the subsidiary of a parent corporation may
not adopt the plan and have the plan "qualify" under CODE S 401 (a) if at the time of adop-
tion it has no personnel who meet the eligibility requirements of the parent's otherwise quali-
fied plan. Rev. Rul. 56-629, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 1056.
136. See P.S. No. 51, pt. A.
137. This term has not heretofore been used. CODE § 401 (a) (5) provides that a plan will
not be discriminatory merely because it excludes employees "the whole of whose remunera-
tion constitutes 'wages' under CODE § 3121 (a) (1) (relating to the Federal Insurance Con-
tributions Act)," i.e., have earnings not exceeding $4,800 per year. The Service has con-
sistently held that Congress impliedly restricted the size of the benefit based on earnings in
excess of $4,800 so that the value thereof would not exceed the value of benefits under social
security if social security benefits would be based on excess earnings. See I.T. 3613, 1942
CuM. BULL. 475; I.T. 3614, 1943 CuM. BULL. 476; I.T. 3615, 1943 CUM. BULL. 477; Mim.
5539, 1943 CUM. BULL. 499; P.S. No. 30; Mim. 6641, 1951-1 CuM. BULL. 41; Reg. § 1.401-
3 (c) (i) (1963). Cf., Cavell, A Note on Plans Involving Integration with Social Security Bene-
fits, in 6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE OF ACrUARIES IN PUBLIC PRAcTIcE 207-21.
Senator Robert Taft did not believe the Treasury Department's position to be consonant with
the law. In Taft, Pension Trusts and Welfare Funds, Journal of Commerce, May 29, 1946,
the author states:
The requirement that the pension funds be integrated with Social Security has always
seemed to me unsound. The Government has chosen to take a special interest in
persons earning $3,000 and less, but there seems to be no reason why a company
may not treat on a more liberal basis those in whom the Government has taken only
a minor interest .... The private plan should conform to certain definite specifica-
tions applied to it, but ff it overlaps the Social Security law, what difference does
that make? Furthermore, I am quite confident that Congress never intended the
Commissioner to have power to compel integration.
138. Rev. Rul. 276, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 401; Rev. Rul. 157, pt. 4(g), 1961-2 CuM. BULL.
67, 86.
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actuarial factors. In other words, the program is likely to be valued as if
the employees are employed by one employer instead of several. The
problem then arises as to what portion of the trust fund can be segre-
gated from the portfolio and then distributed to the participants of the
retiring company. The problems are compounded when, in closely af-
filiated companies, employment transfers occur on closing down of one
company.
How then is counsel to accomplish the objective of equitable segrega-
tion at termination by the tool of text adopted when the plan is inau-
gurated? First, the plan does not have to provide that there will be any
change in its operation. It may provide that those who retired originally
may continue to draw benefits. With respect to deductions, Revenue
Ruling 56-629 provides that a parent may contribute and take deductions
for money paid to fund pension credits earned with respect to the parent
and not the subsidiary. Thus, a basis of deduction of limited applicability
is afforded for contributions by the parent if the subsidiary terminates.
If there is no pension cost applying to the parent, then the terminating
subsidiary may make a final contribution to the plan in which event the
problems of the carry-forward must be considered. 9 The details of de-
termining the liability of the subsidiary in this respect may have to be
worked out in a contract carefully drawn in collaboration with the actuary.
Such agreements are complex where the stock-ownership in the subsidiary
is not the same as in the parent, and where the transaction takes on
certain arms length proportions.
Second, if the plan does provide that there must be a segregation, the
plan's textual mandate should be couched in broad, general terms such as:
an actuarial valuation shall be made to segregate the assets applicable to
the group with respect to which the plan is being terminated from the
other assets. The segregated assets may then be allocated on such a basis
as would exist in an individual employer situation. However, this is not
the only means. The provision can also be couched so as to weight the
segregation in terms of the length of time of contribution by the terminat-
ing employer.
Each situation involving the termination of an individual employer in
a multiple affiliated employer program has, in the experience of the
writer, presented situations so unique that the broader the language pre-
scribing termination procedures, the better. In this respect, it is necessary
to be flexible to revise the program if that should prove desirable.
The Service has not discussed the proper text to be used in developing
clauses to implement Mimeograph 5717 in multiple-employer, multiple
payroll cases.




In a previous part of this article, mention was made of the necessity
of notification by the employer to the union, or vice versa, that a negoti-
ated plan shall terminate. Aside from this problem of notification, it
has been the writer's experience that it is necessary for the parties to nego-
tiate an agreement of termination, stipulating:
(a) that the employer has paid in full the sums he owes by
contract;
(b) that the union releases the employer from further liability;
(c) that the parties agree as to who shall be included in the
census of persons to receive benefits, and their shares;
(d) that the parties agree on the means of distribution of the
shares;
(e) that the parties agree on the amount of payment of ex-
penses and fees; and
(f) other matters.
Such an agreement is highly advantageous to the employer in the single
employer single union type negotiated program. It may not, however,
be necessary to negotiate any such arrangement in the industry-wide plan
or area-wide plan.
Industry-Wide and Area-Wide Plans
Early in the development of negotiated pension plans, labor attempted
to incorporate provisions for reciprocal credits into negotiated plans.
The result of such an arrangement would have been to transfer a
liability to another plan and the certification of actuarial soundness, re-
quired in the "cents-per-hour" plan, could not have been made without
some knowledge of the details of these agreements. 40 As an alternative,
"area-wide .... industry-wide," and "association-wide" plans came into be-
ing. 4' Area-wide plans cover employees in the same union in a certain
geographical area who are not necessarily in the same industry. Industry
wide plans cover employees in the same union who are, but need not be,
in the same geographical area.
In all of these programs, free transfer of pension credits is possible.
There is no difficulty in giving the certification of actuarial soundness
where the contribution rate and benefit amount are fixed. The employer
is not reluctant to grant vesting or credits for work done with a competi-
tor since he knows what the cost of these liabilities are (cents-per-hour-
wise) and his commitment does not go beyond that amount. But more
140. Weiss, Funding Practices Under Labor Negotiated Pension Plans, in 2 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONFERENCE OF ACrUARUEs IN PUBLIC PRACcE 94 (1952).
141. Ibid.
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important, there is one trust, and the portfolio is large enough to permit
long range investments, thereby increasing the yields, and the group cov-
ered can pool mortality after retirement. As in the multi-employer plan,
the program is valued on a consolidated basis.
It must be recognized, in considering termination problems of a single-
employer under an area or industry-wide plan, that there is an affiliation
among the employees rather than the employers. As such, there are rea-
sons why benefits should not be affected if the plan continues after the
withdrawal of one employer.
First, the plan may be treated as though it were a plan for a single
employer having a multiple number of plants. Under such an approach,
the closing down of a plant does not affect the operation of the plan.
Those employees who have retired prior to the termination of the plant, or
who retire at the time of the plant's closing will receive their pensions,
and those with vested interests according to the terms of the plan will
continue to have potential vested benefits from the program. Those who
are not otherwise vested upon termination of employment are, as before,
not vested. This seems to work out particularly well where the program
is valued on the basis of all the employers contributing uniformly with
respect to all the employees. This is analagous to a single employer who
contributes uniformly without regard to any of its subdivisions dosing
down.
Second, the plan may be regarded as a plan being maintained by the
employees, with contributions being made by the employers instead of the
employees, only to avoid any tax which might be imposed upon the em-
ployees before they contribute to the trust.' The actuary would value
the program from the beginning on the assumption that all of the em-
ployees, no matter where they are working, were going to contribute to
the plan during all of their working life, and would ignore the possibility
that any of them would be thrown out of the contributing group by rea-
son of undue labor turnover caused by closing down any of the enterprises
which employ them. On this basis the contribution is fixed, and as fixed,
either at the time of establishment or on renegotiation, the benefit changes
according to the measurement of actuarial liabilities and assets. It is to
be noted in this respect that there is no difference between the conclusion
reached if this philosophy is followed or the first philosophy is followed.
The theories presented above are appealing in a program where there
is a uniformity of contribution rate and where contributions are not made
to the plan by any particular employer with regard to its own actuarial
liabilities, and where there is such free transferability of employment that
142. Cf. Rev. Rul. 190, 1954-1 CuM, BULL. 46, which holds that employees required to
contribute to a pension fund to maintain union status may deduct therefor if they itemize. How-
ever, where the employees claim a standard deduction, the ruling is not of much help.
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those who are employed by the terminating employer may be reemployed
by other contributing employers in the same area and industry.
It should be recognized that in these programs, contributions are nego-
tiated and the parties then negotiate a change in benefit. The benefit is
then influenced by the effect of the addition on the new employers, and
by the withdrawal of companies. So long as the parties have accepted
the benefit as being reasonable, and the issue of contributions is dosed,
there is little merit to effecting a partial termination.
When a union plan terminates, the Service normally waives the filing
of customary information under Items 3 and 4 of Exhibit A, Revenue Pro-
cedure 56-12. In Revenue Ruling 55-204, the Service indicated that it
would accept a simplified basis of filing information in area-wide and in-
dustry-wide plans. There is reason to believe, therefore, that the detailed
information required by Revenue Procedure 56-12, Exhibit A, would not
have to be filed.
CONCLUSION
The widespread tax implications which result from termination of
pension and profit sharing plans suggest the importance of anticipating
the tax consequences at the inception of such plans. It is not suggested,
however, that excessive caution should lead to reluctance to inaugurate such
plans. Rather, the intention of the author has been to emphasize that
pension and profit sharing plans are significant factors in today's system
of employer-employee relations - not to be blindly adopted or blithely
dropped.
Many of the problems discussed in this article are less likely to occur
if, after proper drafting of the original instrument, adequate records are
maintained. Employers who carry out such obligations are in a better
position to adjust to the realities of the business cycle which may ulti-
mately dictate that a plan be curtailed or terminated.
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